"Becoming urban". A study of post-relocation life and livelihood changes among former peasants in Chenggong, China by Yang, Cheng
  
Cheng Yang 
“Becoming urban” 
A study of post-relocation life and livelihood changes among 
former peasants in Chenggong, China 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the M. Phil. Degree 
Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen 
June 2014 
i 
 
  
ii 
 
Acknowledgement 
First and foremost I would like to thank the people in Chenggong, although I cannot mention 
their names here and I have to give them pseudonyms in the text of this thesis. I want to thank 
them for letting me participate in their daily lives and sharing their experiences and life stories 
with me.  
Professor Leif O. Manger has been my supervisor, and I am deeply indebted to our 
inspiring discussion, his thoughtful guidance, critics, efforts to sharpen my argument, 
commitment to my project, patience and untiring help in the process. 
I owe special thanks to Professor Jiansheng Huang, who among the first to read and 
comment my research proposal, continued to offer me advice during fieldwork, read through 
one of my final drafts and gave critical advice; I also am grateful to Professor Li Zhang, who 
read my project proposal and gave valuable comments and theoretical inspiration.  
Professor Ningsheng Wang, who just passed away before I could present a draft for 
him to read, Professor Lijuan Ma, Doctor Louise Cort and Doctor Leedom Lefferts are crucial 
factors that enabled me to begin this intriguing study of anthropology of development. Here, I 
would like to express my deep gratitude to them. 
Other people who deserve special thanks are Solveig Stornes, Dag Inge Bøe and 
Camilla Haug, who shared the same interest in China. I have benefited greatly from 
discussions with them. They deserve special thanks also for reading and commenting either 
my research proposal or some of my drafts. I am happy to have spent the last two years with 
my fellow students on the 8th floor, and I am grateful for the interesting discussions and good 
times we had together. I would also particularly like to thank Ingvild Festervoll Melien and 
Liv Unni Stuhaug, my former classmates of the joint course in the year of 2012 in Kunming, 
and Ms. Ming Cai for their warm friendship during my stay in Bergen. 
Finally, I extend my most sincere gratitude to my parents. With their caring and actual 
participation, my fieldwork was very fruitful and pleasant.  Last, but not least, I am forever 
grateful to my husband Tianjun Zhang for always supporting me to pursue my interest, giving 
brilliant advice and critics on my work and being such a good scholarly partner and soul mate.  
 
Cheng Yang 
Bergen, Norway, June 19
th
 2014 
iii 
 
Abstract 
This thesis presents an ethnographic study of post-relocation life and livelihood of the “land-
lost peasants” in Chenggong, China. The wider context for my study is the ongoing process of 
urbanization in the country. Drastic urbanization all over China during the last two decades 
has produced “land-lost peasants” as a new group of subjects within the Chinese rural 
population, a group that saw their land appropriated in the name of development. The land has 
been taken by the state, referring to the reality of state land-tenure in China, while the 
peasants got cash compensation in return, as part of their relocation. Many studies of such 
urbanization processes have shown that the loss of land and the relocation often have caused 
poverty and the rupture of the village collective. Urbanization in China has therefore been 
interpreted as processes of state power and discipline in China and cases of popular resistance 
against such state power. My study is part of this Chinese story of urbanization, but my 
empirical findings modify the impression that all urbanization in China only leads to negative 
problems for the people involved.  
Kunming’s urban expansion plans to include Chenggong, a well-known agricultural 
county, as its sixth district with its new municipal government complex and a college town. 
The villagers of this study come originally from three adjacent villages that lost their land for 
the construction of the college town and who were subsequently relocated to the same 
resettlement residential compound located among the college campuses. Villagers are 
supposed to live like urbanites in this urban residential compound, but my study shows that 
the standardized urban residential compound and urban settings do not urbanize people 
immediately. Instead, they manage to revive their village ways of life, and to continue to 
value their social network within it. Sponsored by the local state, some villagers continue as 
peasants in neighboring counties. These farming entrepreneurs lead a semi-rural and semi-
urban life, yet they become used in state propaganda in the media as typical evidence of how 
urbanization actually benefits land-lost peasants. The remaining majority of villagers stay in 
Chenggong to exploit the local markets in various ways, for labor as well as for commercial 
activities. A close relationship emerges between land-lost peasants and the local urbanization 
in that villagers’ wealth (wage, property value, collective dividend) is closely related to the 
development of Chenggong. Based on the ethnographic study, I argue that the re-
territorialization of land-lost peasants in Chenggong after relocation is not only a top-down 
process, defined by the state. Rather, it is achieved based on local dynamics, which include 
the locational advantage, the special nature of the college town, the intervention of local 
policies and, most importantly, the agency of the people themselves. In conclusion, I reflect 
on the way the ongoing urbanization process I have observed in Chenggong relates to broader 
processes of rural subject making in the history of socialist China. I conclude that my case 
shows that a new subjectivity may emerge among land-lost peasants in Chenggong, a 
subjectivity which may move people in directions not envisaged by the Chinese state.  The 
key element here is variation - as the effects of such changes will vary between the sexes, 
across generations and with available economic assets.  
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General introduction 
Problem statement and key questions 
This thesis is about rural people who used to live in three agricultural villages in 
Chenggong, in the suburbia of Kunming, China. Chenggong was an agricultural 
county with a long history. This history came to an end since 2003 when Kunming 
Municipal Government announced their intention to build the new municipal 
government complex and a college town there and integrate the entire Chenggong as a 
new district into Kunming City. This new district locating future political and 
educational center of Kunming would be built on local peasants’ farmland and 
produce tens of thousands of land-lost peasants
1
 [shidi nonmin].  
As the provincial capital city of Yunnan, a frontier province in southwest 
China, Kunming is under the double pressure of being “late” and “backward” on 
economic development (Zhang 2006:462). Such a political discourse justifies the 
municipal government to speed up the process of urbanization (Zhang 2006:464). The 
slogans of the “one-step urbanization” 2  [yibu chengshihua] and “to construct the 
modernized new Kunming” well manifest the resolution of the local government. The 
urban expansion scheme was conceived by Kunming Municipal Government in 2003, 
in which Chenggong would be developed as a new district of Kunming. In 2011, 
Chenggong was officially redesignated to be the sixth district of Kunming by Chinese 
Central Government.  
                                                     
1
 Some authors also use “displaced peasants” (Hsing 2010:183), or “landless peasants/farmers” (Wu 
2010:81). They all refer to peasants whose land was all or partly appropriated by the state for the urban 
expansion or the construction of modernization projects such as dams, airports, and college towns. I use 
“land-lost peasants” to stress that the landlessness of the group of my study is involuntary.  
2
 The "one-step urbanization" is a guiding principle adopted by the district government of Chenggong 
in building the new city. It means that the villagers whose land is requisitioned in building the city 
should be resettled to live in urban department buildings rather than village-like residential areas with 
self-built houses which sooner or later would be resettled again. In the Annual Working Report of 
Chenggong District Government in 2013, it says "under the requirement of Kunming Municipal 
Government, the dislocated people should be resettled to concentrated, planned resettlement residential 
compounds so that they change directly from rural population to urban citizen with the principle of the 
‘one-step urbanization’" (Chenggong Online, January 14th 2013). 
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According to the construction scheme, the new district involves the entire 
county of Chenggong with the area of 460 km
2
, in which fourteen plots with 18,500 
mu
3
 in total are reserved to build resettlement residential compounds [anzhi xiaoqu] 
for the relocated peasants. The construction of the new district appropriated land of 
120,000 mu and 68,000 peasants lost all or part of their farmland and houses between 
2003 and 2013 (Kunming Daily, July 9
th
 2013).There have been 10,000 villagers in 
ten villages relocated to the resettlement residential compounds by 2013 (Kunming 
Daily, July 9
th
 2013). It is estimated that the new city construction in Chenggong will 
produce 100,000 land-lost peasants in total. 
My fieldwork
4
 was carried out in one of these resettlement residential 
compounds. The resettlement residential compound of my study was completed in 
2009. Its 4,000 residents are from three different villages. They were dislocated for 
the construction of the college town which is regarded as a catalyst project for the new 
district. I name them North village, Middle village and South village based on their 
relative location in the resettlement residential compound. North village was first 
relocated in the compound in 2005 and the other two villages were moved in later in 
2009. The resettlement residential compound was built on a piece of land originally 
with the ownership of South village and now neighbors the campuses of two colleges. 
Before relocation, the villagers made their living from growing vegetables, fruits and 
flowers which were sold all over the country. After the land appropriation, they 
become land-lost peasants and are relocated to apartments in the same resettlement 
residential compound with totally different contexts for their lives and are supposed to 
find their new livelihoods in the city. 
My story then is one of urbanization. The “one-step urbanization” proposed by 
the district government of Chenggong expects two changes: the urbanization of the 
land and the direct rural-to-urban shift of land-lost peasants. The large rural area with 
fields and farming villages will be transformed to the urban core of “new Kunming” 
with its municipal government complex and a college town together with various 
modern property projects. This urban process does not evict the local dislocated 
villagers. Instead, dislocated villagers are schemed to be transformed into urban 
                                                     
3
 Chinese square unit. One mu is 666.7 m
2
.  
4
 See Table of figures. 
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residents and relocated in Chenggong to make them a resource for the development of 
the new city of Kunming. A Chinese buzzword renqi 
5
 (which can be translated as 
“human vitality”, dynamisms or popularity) is always discursively associated with the 
new district construction. The construction of the college town in the new district is 
regarded as a good catalyst to help aggregating renqi for a virginally developed urban 
area like this. Nine universities with 100,000 students and teachers relocated in the 
college town from downtown Kunming. The college town in Chenggong alone equals 
what would be counted as a small city in Europe. 
With many empty residential compounds, unoccupied luxury villas or 
megablock complexes, wide roads devoid of pedestrians and cars, and the continuous 
building of new high rises everywhere, Chenggong is titled a “ghost town” by foreign 
media (BBC News, August 14
th
 2012; Foreignpolicy, June 21
st
 2013). These 
phenomena can be summarized in one Chinese word “renqi” that is frequently 
mentioned in people’s daily conversation. My fieldwork reveals that the expected 
renqi in the area of the college town is quite seasonal and follows the time schedule of 
students in colleges. For example, the business center and shopping streets in the 
college town are bustling with people at times, but look very bleak in February, July 
and August when college students have their holidays. Renqi indicating the 
commercial prosperity is crucial to the reemployment and livelihood of local land-lost 
peasants.  
My aim is to understand better the effects of this relocation. What does it mean 
to people whose knowledge and experience is only from agriculture, when they now 
are supposed to live like urbanites in Kunming. They received cash compensation 
from the government for land requisition, and it will be of interest to find out to what 
extent this compensates for the much higher urban living cost and their limited 
survival skills in a metropolitan city. Will they adapt to the urban environment, or will 
they try to find ways of continuing to be peasants? Obviously, this is not only 
dependent on the preference of the people themselves, but also depends on a number 
of dynamics that the relocated peasants have to deal with. As we shall see, farming is 
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 Renqi literarily means the breath of energy of human beings in Chinese and is derived from the Daoist 
notion that “the ideal state of being is one in which human beings are harmoniously immersed in nature 
or physical surroundings” (see Zhang 2006:471). 
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indeed possible. Some peasants seem not willing to give up being peasants, and 
choose to rent land from other peasants in neighboring counties to continue their 
agricultural livelihood. This makes them into semi-peasants and semi-urbanites. 
However, the remaining people do not choose this way. They seek employment in the 
new urban settings. They either work as wage labors on the university campuses, or 
try their luck in commercial activities. Alternatively, some people try to live off the 
compensation money they got, at least temporarily experiencing some affluence.  
My overall questions are: How do the processes of urbanization influence the 
life and livelihood of land-lost peasants? How do villagers react to the processes and 
adapt to the urban context? Considering the local relocation policy of the “one-step 
urbanization” aims to relocate a village as a whole, I am also interested in how the 
processes influence the village community. To what extent are they operating in ways 
reminiscent of their former village life? Do we still see tendencies towards many 
collective practices that characterize their former village life, or does urbanization 
also mean processes of individualization (see Yan 2009; Kipnis 2012)? To answer 
such questions we need to look closer at the social and cultural context of the 
relocated peasants in their new urban environment. And we need to know more about 
some important contexts with relevance to the new life-situation of my study group.  
China’s urbanization 
A basic context is the one of urbanization. Urbanization is an economy-motivated and 
institutionalized process in China. In September 1997, Jiang Zemin, China’s President 
at the time, delivered his report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China, pointing out: 
China should gradually change the current status of underdevelopment to 
basically realize socialist modernization, changing from an agricultural country 
with a majority labor to an industrialized country with a majority of non-
agricultural population and focusing on modern agriculture and modern service 
industries, progressing from the stage focusing on natural and semi-natural 
economies to a historical stage with relatively high degree of economic 
marketization. (Gu 2012:123) 
Shaped by this discourse, the urban population in the mainland of the People's 
Republic of China reached 691,000,000 by the end of 2011or 51.2% of the nation’s 
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total population. Between 1990 and 2002, an estimated 50,000,000-66,000,000 
peasants lost all or part of their farmland and homes to local government land grabs 
and development projects (Hsing 2010:17). State land-tenure facilitates the land 
appropriation. According to People’s Republic of China (PRC) Constitution and Land 
Management Law, all urban land belongs to the state; land in the countryside and in 
suburban areas is collectively owned by villages and cannot be leased out for profit. 
Legal provisions, and the socialist propaganda and pedagogy construct the common 
imagination that the planning power of urban governments to rezone and appropriate 
land is legitimate, which makes the massive and drastic appropriation and demolition 
possible.  
The English word “urbanization” corresponds to two words in Chinese 
language: townization [chengzhenhua] and citization [chengshihua]. Guldin (2001) 
specifically differentiates these two different words as well as distinct processes in 
China’s urbanization. He argues that urbanization as a conceptual frame is too broad 
to describe the urbanization process in contemporary China. Conceptually, Guldin 
divides the urbanization process into three different dimensions: deagriculturization, 
townization, and citization (2001:13). In his PRC 1990 Urbanization Continuum 
Model, based on the level of urbanization, from rural to urban, he defines the society 
of China as village, market town [nongcun jizhen], xiang town, county town, county-
level city, small city, medium-sized city, large city and metropolis. De-
agriculturization of the countryside is the first aspect of the rural transformation 
whereby many people give up farming but remain in the villages and the rural area. 
The second dimension is this rural population’s engagement with town enterprises and 
activities leading to a general townization of the persons and their villages, and 
decreasing the difference between village, market town, and xiang town. Lastly, 
citization (“city-ization”) affects the county towns toward cities as influences flow 
from that end of the continuum. “China’s urbanization is thus proceeding along a 
continuum of townization and citization, where the rates of urbanization may differ 
between north and south, coast and interior, and prosperous and less developed areas” 
(Guldin 2001:19). As far as this conceptual model is concerned, the case of 
Chenggong spans both ends of Guldin’s rural-urban continuum. The urbanization 
6 
 
process in Chenggong de-agriculturizes the countryside and meanwhile city-izes it to 
the new urban core, which the “one-step urbanization” implies.  
Based on a similar conceptual continuum model, Hsing (2010:10) identifies 
China’s current urbanization in three salient trajectories at three types of “places” 
using a model of cultural geography. The first is an inward contraction of the urban 
core. Through the redevelopment project, the former urban residents are relocated to 
tall apartment buildings in new residential compounds perhaps with better living 
conditions yet often located in the outskirt of the city, while the inner-city area is sold 
to real-estate developers constructing new shopping plazas to improve its commercial 
value. The second is an outward expansion into villages at the urban fringe of the 
metropolitan region where the property value has potential to increase greatly. The 
urbanization happening in this type of place often causes the generation of a new 
group of rural subjects: land-lost peasants who later are reduced to “urban villagers”. 
Peasants lose either their farmland or their housing land or both during the process. 
The third trajectory happens at the rural fringe of the metropolitan region, where 
townships and villages convert and lease out farmland for scattered industrial and 
commercial projects. Applying Hsing’s conceptual model to the practice in 
Chenggong shows that the urbanization follows the second type of trajectory, yet 
happens at a place as described in the third trajectory. With its distinctiveness, the 
case in Chenggong can enrich the ethnographic research on China’s urbanization.  
Both Guldin and Hsing conceptualize China’s urbanization as a spatial 
continuum from rural to urban, yet it brings about different dynamics which indicate 
the complexity and unevenness of China’s urbanization. Moreover, the boundaries 
between different types overlap, since “dynamics within one place often trigger 
changes in others” (Hsing 2010:23). Different urbanization processes engender 
various impacts on the rural population in China. Significantly, they have produced 
three salient groups from the rural population, which composes the second context of 
my analysis. 
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Three rural subjects produced by urbanization  
Contemporary urbanization in China produces three types of subjects: rural migrants, 
“urban villagers” and land-lost peasants. In a way, each of them is problematic for 
both the modernization of China and the construction of a “harmonious socialist 
country”, two central elements in official jargons in China. 
Rural migrants, known in China as the “floating population” [liudong renkou], 
are those who have left their villages for big cities to look for work and business 
opportunities (Zhang 2001:179). The word “floating” in Chinese concept implies that 
these people are not and will not become a permanently settled group in cities due to 
the restriction of the hukou 
6
system (Solinger 1999:15). Without an urban hukou, rural 
migrants are excluded from accessing public welfare such as schooling and medical 
care in an urban setting. They have to face much stricter loan terms for buying urban 
housing as well. In order to cope with the high living cost in cities and save more to 
remit back to their rural families, most of rural migrants consciously reduce their 
quality of life (Wu 2010:82). The cost-saving method makes them easily give up 
children’s education, avoid seeing a doctor when ill and reside in cheap and poorly-
conditioned neighborhoods, such as the so-called “urban villages”. There are 
100,000,000 rural transients in China and managing the mobile, fluid and culturally 
diverse migrant population and the migrant enclaves has been regarded as the most 
difficult task for the past-Mao political regime (Zhang 2001:179,195). Noticeably, 
with many rural adults leaving their hometowns for large cities, a lot of rural villages 
have become “empty villages” with only the elderly and children. Accordingly, their 
village collectives are nearly disintegrated.  
“Urban villagers” are defined according to the place they reside, well-known 
by the term “urban villages” (chengzhongcun, which literally means “villages within 
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 The household registration system, known as the hukou system in China, identifies a person of the 
population either rural (agricultural) or urban (non-agricultural) as well as a place of belonging. At the 
higher point of this mechanism of social control between its establishment in 1950s and the era before 
the reform and opening up at the end of 1980s, mobility was difficult, goods such as grain, cooking oil 
and cotton clothes were rationed, and only urban dwellers with appropriate hukou were issued with 
coupons for these goods (Stockman 2000:54). Hukou does not strictly confine mobility anymore since 
1990s, but still differentiates a person’s access to social welfare and public services.  
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the city”) in Chinese. Within the breakneck urbanization, the expansion of Chinese 
cities has been encroaching into surrounding villages since the 1990s (Liu and He 
2010:177). In many cases, villagers maintain their houses and their housing plots 
[zhaijidi] within the village settlement while losing their farmland for the urban 
expansion. Partially or entirely losing farming as their livelihood renders rents 
important income that urban villagers can readily obtain in cities. Villagers manage to 
expand their rental income in their limited space, by, for example, increasing the 
number of floors of their housing. “Urban villages” are characterized overall by 
narrow roads, face-to-face buildings with different heights and add-on temporary 
rooms on the top, and the inner streets packed with shops, grocery stores and service 
outlets. Terms such as the “shake-hands buildings” [woshoulou] or the “kissing 
buildings” [jiewenlou] are coined by Chinese media to delineate its chaos [luan]. In 
addition, the low living cost and low rent attract the “floating population” to reside 
and hence become their enclaves in a sense. Portrayed by the media, the government 
and even the academia as crowded, chaotic, unhealthy and unsafe, urban villages are 
often targets of the municipal redevelopment projects and residents inside are faced 
with eviction, demolition and relocation. In expectation of demolition by government, 
many urban villagers “prepare” themselves by adding more floors and rooms to their 
housing while using cheap construction materials, hoping to acquire more cash 
compensation and free floor area in the coming relocation, which makes the situation 
in urban villages closer to the public rhetoric. While “urban villages” are demonized 
as barriers for further development of cities, its residents, the “urban villagers”, are 
forgotten having been stricken by previous rounds of urbanization.  
 Land-lost peasants [shidi nongmin], literally means peasants who have lost 
their land, are the third group of rural subjects produced by the nation-wide 
urbanization. As a result of urban expansion, an estimated 50,000,000 to 66,000,000 
Chinese peasants lost all or part of their farmland and houses between 1990 and 2003. 
Although we do not find many references about it in the English language literature, 
the study on land-lost peasants in China does receive significant attention in Chinese 
academia. When using the key word “shidi nongming” as the title word to search the 
database of CNKI (Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure), more than 6,000 
results are displayed including news reports and academic papers. The research result 
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also displays that the term has been used discursively since 2002. Many Chinese 
scholars link this subject to illegal land grabs, forced evictions, peasants’ protests and 
social instability. The Annual Report on Urban Development of China, no. 5, released 
by China Social Academic Press in 2012, lists the top ten challenges confronting 
urban China, and on this list the issue of land-lost peasants is ranked as the fifth. 
There are more than 40,000,000 peasants implicated in the appropriation of land in 
China and the report points out that this would easily cause social instability if issues 
such as cash compensation, allocation of collective assets, reemployment and pension 
are not properly dealt with (Chinanews August 14
th
 2012). Many domestic Chinese 
scholars write papers to suggest the government be serious about the dislocation and 
relocation policy, compensation scheme and reemployment of the group (see, for 
example, Yu and Cao 2004; Zhai and Xiang 2012; Li 2004). However, in spite of the 
prevalent attention, few trace the outcome and impact of urbanization on land-lost 
peasants through detailed ethnographies, which is the concern of my thesis.  
First step towards theorization: space and territoriality 
There are many ways of bringing together the macro contexts indicated above with 
the data of my micro-oriented fieldwork, but here I want to highlight a focus on space 
and territoriality as a thematic framework of importance to my discussion. Drawing 
on theorists of cultural geography who argue that social space
7
 (as opposed to merely 
a passive locus or “container” of human activities and social relations) is implicated in 
all social processes, Zhang (2001:7) contends that space is constituted through 
practices and power relations, and that social relationships and political domination 
are spatially constituted and transformed. From this perspective, the unmaking and 
making of space must implicate transitions of social relations. Zhang classifies social 
space at three levels: “the micro level, which includes architecture, neighborhood, 
housing, and street; the middle level, which involves town, city, and rural-urban 
asymmetry; and the macro level, which encompasses national and global 
organizations and strategies” (2001:202). My ethnography focuses on the social space 
of a resettlement residential compound at the micro level, but is inevitably embedded 
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 See also Lefebvre (1991).  
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in the middle level context with Chenggong’s geographical, economic, political and 
social specifics and the macro urbanization process in China. 
Based on the realities that the Chinese government owns the land, wields 
planning power and dominates land tenure, it can control the urban-rural mobility and 
supersede the market to dictate the direction and pace of urban growth. Some label 
Chinese urban process “state-led urbanization” in the frame of the state-market 
dichotomy. Hsing (2010:7) criticizes that this argument ignores the urban process as 
an integral part of the local state. She stresses the roles played at the middle level by 
arguing that the local state plays a more active role than merely being an agent of the 
central state and urban construction has become the key mechanism of local state 
building. Hsing defines territoriality as spatial strategies to consolidate power in a 
given place and time and is a tool of dominance as well as means of resistance. On the 
one hand, territoriality is the most important aspect of the local state’s power strategy 
and local state improves its territoriality via urbanization. This means: firstly, the land 
planning and zoning are important authority practices of the local state. Secondly, 
large-scale and prestigious development projects such as airports, highways, industrial 
zones and new cities and value created through skyrocketing prices in their wake 
become the manifestation of the local state’s governing capacity. Thirdly, land rents 
are one of the major local revenue sources. On the other hand, social actors, including 
village collectives, displaced villagers or residents consciously struggle to define and 
defend the occupation and control of a place and develop territorial strategies 
contradicting the state’s territorial logic as a tool of resistance for self-protection. 
Hsing define social actors’ conscious cultivation and struggle to form their own 
territoriality at both physical and discursive levels as “civic territoriality” (2010:15). 
Hsing (2010:16) writes further that “civic territoriality involves processes of 
territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization, as well as the possibilities 
of building society’s own territorial logic and autonomy”. As urbanism largely took 
over industrialism as the basis for political legitimacy and policy discourse by the 
mid-2000s, the notion of civic territoriality “brings society to the center of territorial 
politics, and places it at the root of social actions” (Hsing 2010:15). 
When analyzing the interwoven politics of the urbanization of the local state 
and the civic territoriality, Hsing chooses to follow the administrative boundary of 
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large municipalities to define the “metropolitan region”. Within the metropolitan 
jurisdictive region, she categorizes urbanization into three types: the urban core, the 
urban fringe, and the rural fringe. Each type of cases stresses different but salient 
urbanization process proceeding in China. Her urban core type focuses on the 
redevelopment of inner-city in Beijing. Her urban fringe type illustrates the 
metropolitan expansion into the neighboring villages in southeast coastal cities such 
as Guangzhou and Shenzhen and how the land-owning village collectives in the form 
of a share-holding company (see Hsing 2010; Po 2008) skillfully bargained with the 
urban government to fulfill a successful case of territorialization. Her rural fringe type 
examines the deterritorialization of villagers in the remote rural fringe areas and the 
fragmentation and localization of their protests. 
In my case, based on Hsing’s model, the metropolitan region of Kunming 
covers six districts, seven counties and one city, just as large as its municipal 
jurisdiction. The urban core of Kunming used to cover five districts. Chenggong was 
recently designated as the sixth and the one with the new municipal government 
complex and the college town. The urbanization process in Chenggong can be 
categorized as Hsing’s urban fringe type, since Chenggong used to be a county 
adjacent to Kunming and under its jurisdiction. The specifics of the case lie in: 
administratively the whole old Chenggong County is “one-step” urbanized to be an 
important new district of Kunming where its new administrative center and cultural 
center are constructed. The local state exerts the “one-step urbanization” in 
Chenggong to make land-lost peasants urban residents while avoiding appearance of 
“urban villages”. 
The “one-step urbanization” applied in Chenggong is specialized to 
differentiate the former demolishment and relocation policy widely applied in the 
urbanization process in China. In some similar new city projects (see Hsing 2010; Zhu 
2011), the compensation package offered by the local state often reserves a plot of the 
dislocated village’s original collective land for relocation, where the dislocated village 
can reconstruct the whole village. However, the recent official discourse argues that to 
let villagers build their housing will cause the emergence of new “urban villages”. 
Informed by this discourse, the local state of Chenggong proposes the scheme of 
“one-step urbanization”, which stresses that the construction of the resettlement 
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residential compound should be planned and built entirely by local government. 
Besides the building of the urban residential area, the “one-step urbanization” also 
signifies “the direct shift from rural to urban”.  
Second step towards theorization: governmentality and capital 
Urbanization in China thus produces new challenges to people. The drastic change 
forces people to choose different livelihoods through various adaptation rationalities 
in urban settings, and this is also the case in Chenggong. However, the case does not 
show a complete change in which old ways are left behind, and in which new, 
urbanized and individualized ways take over. Certainly, people have to find new ways 
of earning money, either through employment and business activities in urban settings, 
or as farming entrepreneurs in districts where land for cultivation is still available. 
Such new economic strategies thus affect processes of differentiation among people 
and affect their own views of themselves as urban citizens of China. However, I 
observed clear processes that indicate a willingness to maintain earlier ways of socio-
cultural life and to embrace a village identity based on the old villages that now are no 
more. An important aim of my thesis is to show the various dynamics behind 
individual livelihood choices and the reproduction of collective identities and social 
networks, thus problematizing and showing the ways the land-lost peasants in 
Chenggong make and re-make themselves as new urban settlers, with subjectivities 
formed and constructed by the ongoing political, economic, and social dynamics 
within which they find themselves. I argue that both livelihood choice and 
territoriality are central to villagers’ subject-making in Chinese urbanization. In a way 
my case illustrates the conclusions drawn by Hsing: 
 Location is a key element affecting the scope and scale of resources 
upon which villagers may draw for self-protection and establishing territorial 
autonomy. Yet, locational advantage does not guarantee success. Conversely, 
relocation almost always brings loss of control over land, disintegration of 
village organization, and rupture of peasants’ collective identity. Location 
matters, but relocation matters more. (Hsing 2010:188). 
Certainly, my case implies the resettlement in a new urban environment, as a 
consequence of the loss of land. Both processes are driven and defined by the Chinese 
authorities in their efforts to modernize and develop China. Thus, it is a case showing 
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one example of what Foucault labelled “discipline” and “governmentality”, the first 
indicating a forced process through which authorities define and build the new urban 
environment in order to make sure the new environment will not end up looking as the 
old village, the second indicating a process through which people are supposed to 
embrace a new urban way of life, adapted to the ways in which the Chinese 
authorities define a cultured and developed population. However, my case shows that 
in spite of the discourse imposed from above, the new urban adaptation among my 
informants does not show a total disintegration of rural society and earlier ways of life. 
Rather, my fieldwork indicates that people actively engage in activities and practices 
that lead to a reproduction of village-based life forms and solidarities, irrespective of 
what the authorities want them to do. 
To understand such processes I find both the Foucauldian concepts of 
discipline and governmentality useful, as well as Bourdieu’s concepts of capital. For 
Foucault’s two concepts, I draw on Dean’s definition: 
Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, 
undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of 
techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working 
through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting 
ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and 
outcomes. (Dean 1999:11) 
Empirically, in my case, the socialist disciplining and governmentality inform 
the ongoing urbanization in contemporary China in several ways. First, the long 
history of land reforms in socialist China constitute the common imagination that the 
land belongs to the socialist state, which leaves little room for peasants’ resistance to 
land appropriation and makes the rapid urbanization possible (Zhu 2011:14). Second, 
the socialist regime justifies its disciplining and governance and facilitates the 
implementation of its policies in different historical periods by creating national 
narratives in which the peasantry discursively is a key part of a Marxist teleology 
stating “in which human societies follow a historical trajectory from feudalism to 
capitalism to socialism to communism” (Kipnis 1997:167). Based on the same 
ideology, the duty of the authorities is to orient the backward and uncivilized rural 
subjects and rural society to urban living, in that it is an “inevitable historical trend”. 
Therefore, urbanization represents a progress towards better life and land-loss is 
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presented as an unavoidable “labor pain” that both the socialist government and her 
people must conquer together, yet to negotiate. In this ideological landscape, the 
benevolent patriarchal government (Yang 2010:550) should exert to “help” her land-
lost peasant subjects to resolve their problems such as relocation and reemployment 
since they are the “contributors” to urbanization. Looking at the official discourses in 
Chenggong shows that seen from the point of view of the government, the policies, 
the planning and construction of the new urban space has followed the broad 
ideological thinking as mentioned above. Nevertheless, seen from the point of view of 
the former peasants we see that they do not totally buy into the government’s thinking, 
nor do they adopt in ways expected by the authorities. Third, policy discourses and 
rationalities of government behind them are changing, with old ones and new ones are 
intertwined and contesting. Current urbanization in China is shaped by both Deng 
Xiaoping’s “development is the absolute principle” and Hu Jintao’s “building a 
harmonious society”. Therefore, “competition over land among various state actors 
affects and is affected by social responses to land grabs” (Hsing 2010:18). Fourth, 
territoriality in urbanization as an important aspect of the local state’s power strategy 
invokes the basis of how the state of China is perceived. Here I agree with Lin and Ho 
when they argue that:“ state in China is a dynamic, complex, heterogeneous and self-
conflicting institutional ensemble, in and through which power and interests of 
different levels of the state are contested, negotiated and mediated” (Lin and Ho in 
Yang and Wang 2008:1039). 
 However, the relocation to the city inevitably brings changes. Whatever the 
starting point, the resettlement implies new livelihoods and new environment for 
carrying out socio-cultural activities, and thus, ultimately affect basic identities and 
relationships among the former peasants. Here we find a dynamic that can be 
understood as “agency” or “resistance”. People certainly do unexpected things, and it 
is of interest to understand the creation and maintenance of such new adaptive 
strategies. To explore such dynamics I relate to Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of forms 
of capital.  
Capital, in Bourdieu’s term, as accumulated labor, is objectified and embodied, 
and takes time to accumulate (1986:241). He contends to reintroduce capital in all its 
forms and not solely in the form recognized by economic theory to account for the 
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structure and functioning of the social world. Bourdieu (1986:243) builds up a general 
science of the economy of practices and proposes four basic forms of capital. These 
are: economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and 
may be institutionalized in the forms of property rights; social capital, which is made 
up of social obligations; cultural capital, which may be in the form of long-lasting 
dispositions of the mind and body or institutionalized in the forms of educational 
qualifications; symbolic capital, which is in the form of prestige and renown attached 
to a family and name (Bourdieu in Smart 1993:391). 
Bourdieu argues that different forms of capital are convertible to one another 
under certain conditions. Bourdieu’s conceptualization of capital is related to the 
specific field in which a form of capital is utilized (Smart 1993:390), which leaves 
space for the proliferation of new types of capital or define new terms as variants of 
Bourdieu’s four basic forms. Let me illustrate. In my case here, I define political 
capital as capital that is brought by the possessor’s position, namely, decided by 
positional power which locates people in organized social relationships of command 
and obedience (Stockman 2000:178). It can, for instance, stem from a professional 
position in the workplace. Specifically, in my research context, political capital is the 
capital a person obtains from holding position as a village cadre. This position of 
village cadres is different from the position of formal government officials since a 
village/community
8
 [shequ] in China is defined as a self-governing organization, with 
leadership chosen through elections instead of appointment. The political capital 
entitles the village cadre the authority to operate collective assets and be the 
representative of the village in dealings between villagers and outsiders. The political 
position as leader and cadre thus means that an individual had the right kinds of 
capital to obtain the position, and holding the position means that the person can 
accumulate further social and symbolic capital, which may convert to economic 
capital. The political capital can also easily convert into economic capital directly 
through corruption (Gu 2004:25) as well. 
                                                     
8
 Community [shequ] as a term in Chinese is a basic unit of urban governance in China (see Bray 
2006:530; Tomba 2009). After the urbanization, villagers are “residents” and villages are communities 
under the jurisdiction of a “sub-district” [jiedao]. Sub-districts/towns are the smallest administrative 
units in China, while communities/villages are instituted as self-governing organizations of 
residents/villagers. 
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In the same way as economic and political capital, we can look at other forms 
of capital and see how they provide a basis for a person’s identity, occupation as well 
as general strategic position in the adaptational game in the new urban context. A big 
sum of cash compensation given by government for the involuntary resettlement 
greatly increased villagers’ economic capital, and it is of interest to see in what ways 
people make use of this, as an economic strategy or as a way to invest in and improve 
other forms of capital. A second aspect of this is to see how the labor market in the 
city opens up for employment opportunities in the new urban space, or how the 
availability of land not yet urbanized opens up for continuous and increased 
engagement in cultivation by some of the former peasants. Since the conversion 
between forms of capital always needs certain conditions, it is of importance to this 
study to show empirically in what ways one type of capital can be transformed into 
other types of capital. The conditions of convertibility are socially regulated and 
structured. Through the socialization, these conditions make and remake the social 
subjects. A famous way such dynamics operate in China is through the concept of 
guanxi (see, for example, Yan 2009; Yang 1994; Kipnis 1997), “the cementing of 
mutually beneficial relationships through the strategic application of gifts, favours and 
banquets” (Unger 1995:317), by which the social relationships implied in the term 
provides a necessary informal bridge that brings transformation of capital about.  
The chapters 
Based on the above empirical and conceptual contexts I shall organize my discussion 
in this thesis in the following manner. In Chapter 1 “From the old village to the new 
city: meeting an urban space defined by the authorities”, my focus is on various forms 
of backgrounds, presenting a historical picture of the old villages and a background 
description of the new urban environment. Here we see both the background of the 
peasants who are my key informants and who make up the key focus of my study, as 
well as the ways the process of urban relocation is defined and pushed forward by the 
authorities. In Chapter 2 “Engaging a new spatial universe: reviving ‘the village’”, my 
focus is more one of “bottom-up” analysis. In spite of all the structural and spatial 
order provided by the authorities, illustrating how the same authorities see a well-
ordered, urban universe, the local people do not adapt to these new contexts in any 
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easily predictable way. Rather than engaging in a total change they engage in a 
revitalization of their old ways, under new circumstances. In the chapter, I discuss the 
various processes by which such a revitalization take place. One focus is on how the 
position as local cadre, the political and administrative leader, has become important 
in new ways. While few were interested in being a cadre back in the village, the new 
resources available after the relocation in the city, has made this position attractive to 
people with resources, or different sorts of capital, as it can become the basis for 
further strategies that might bring both economic and political capital in the future. To 
become elected, and to stay in the position, the leader now plays an active role in 
keeping people together around collective activities, activities generated by the 
compensations received for the loss of land and village, and the collective ways some 
of this compensation has been organized. Collectivities based on kinship and 
marriages are also found, and in order to maintain collective activities linked to these, 
the new townspeople need spaces for marriages, funerals and so on. Also on the 
religious side, we see the need for temples, as the people are Buddhists. Thus, I 
describe how the guest hall and the village temple play a role in keeping people 
focused towards collective aims. As the people no longer are farmers, there is also a 
lot of spare time available, time they spend on chatting and visiting, but also engaging 
workout, such as square dancing for women. Again, the chapter documents the 
activities, and makes an argument about how they contribute to maintaining a 
collective solidarity based on the negotiation between their earlier village custom and 
adaptation for urban life. In Chapter 3 “Employment in the city: exploiting the urban 
labor market”, I describe and analyze the ways the newly settled peasants are able to 
exploit the various possibilities for employment found in their new environment. The 
new university campuses make up an important part of the newly established labor in 
Chenggong. People work there as cleaners and gardeners which are gendered in a 
sense. Drivers of different sorts are also found. The elderly enjoy their relaxing 
retirement time which was not possible before in rural settings. The situation is 
therefore mixed, with dynamics moving towards further economic diversification. A 
few land-lost peasants with abundant accumulated economic capital and necessary 
social capital have become “bosses”. They not only work for themselves but also 
provide job opportunities for others. Some of them do business locally, such as traders; 
others are farming entrepreneurs renting land in other counties and hire local 
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farmworkers to work on their greenhouse farms. I classify them as one category in the 
sense that they generally earn more than other villagers, and they are concerned with 
increasing their savings. In fact, they are rich and capable people in the eyes of their 
fellow villagers, and their business stories are talked about among villagers. Moreover, 
the local government uses them as successful models in public discourses in terms of 
their economic success. In order to defend the merits of urbanization, their specific 
“cultural capital” is recognized and their socio-cultural status presented as “cultured” 
with high “skills”. As such, they help challenge the historical discourses about 
“uncivilized” rural subjects in China. A particular part of the entrepreneurial story, 
that of agricultural entrepreneurs, is particularly important, and I single that one out as 
a separate chapter, namely Chapter 4 “Becoming farming entrepreneurs”. I do this 
because we are now closing a circle, with the former peasants re-engaging in 
agriculture, but under very different circumstances than what we saw in the old and 
traditional village. What they do today is intensive greenhouse production of 
vegetables for the developed markets in east China. This is a strategy engaged in by 
some individuals, and their economic success brings them into the category of 
“bosses”. They rent land, they hire workers, and they are organized together with 
other farmers in marketing chains. However, they are active to demonstrate that they 
still belong to the collective community we described in Chapter 2. They return to the 
city when social events are going on, and they contribute to all kinds of community-
based activities. The chapter shows how land is obtained, and how their new business 
is organized. Moreover, the chapter also discusses in greater detail the ways they 
maintain links back to their fellow villagers in the relocated part of Chenggong. In the 
final Chapter 5 “Conclusion: towards new Chinese subjectivities”, I locate my study 
in the broader context of the rural subjects made in the discourse as well as institution 
of the state in the history of socialist China. By combining the reflection of the 
historical subject-making with the current dynamics, I intend to explore how 
urbanization processes influence people’s subjectivity. From the historical perspective, 
my case in Chenggong is the continuation of subject-making of the regime in current 
time, the era when modernity is defined by urbanization and with more complexity 
brought about by both various levels of state and by social actors competing for the 
territoriality. The processes of urbanization reestablish the new territorial order, and 
influence people’s subjectivity in a multiple way in the process.  
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Methodology 
The thesis is based on six months fieldwork carried out from July to December in 
2013 in Chenggong, Yunnan province, China. I had worked in a college in Kunming 
prior to starting the M.Phil. study. Parts of the college campus started to be relocated 
to Chenggong in 2008. It was easy for students to move and settle down on a new 
campus (that is why college towns are often strategically used as pioneering projects 
for urban expansion), while it was nearly a nightmare for teachers who could not 
move their family immediately to Chenggong. They had to take the school bus 
leaving at seven o’clock in the morning from the campus in Kunming, travel more 
than one hour to Chenggong campus, give lectures and take the bus back to Kunming 
in the afternoon or in the evening, completely exhausted. If they encountered a traffic 
jam in Kunming, which was quite frequent, it could make the time on the way 
doubled. I began to join this long commuting work style in 2010, two years before I 
started my M.Phil. program in Bergen and got some preliminary impression and 
experience about the college town and Chenggong. In retrospect, these experiences 
and impressions are far from the local villagers’ life world. With life based back in 
Kunming, teachers saw Chenggong as merely a place of work; a place someone 
would like to escape after work immediately. At the end of my six-month fieldwork, I 
could fully compare these two different experiences and drew the following 
conclusion: the commuters are still outsiders, while local villagers have more 
emotional attachment with this place although for them the landscape has been totally 
changed.  
Considering that my previous experience as a rushed commuter in Chenggong 
would not give me any substantial help for my fieldwork, I decided to take one month 
to do some preliminary research in the whole region to find out which village could 
answer my research questions and whether I could get better access to it. I visited 
different villages in and around the college town. Since the urbanization plan of 
Chenggong was formulated in 2003, these villages are “urbanized” to various degrees. 
In some cases, villages’ collective land is partially expropriated but does not cause 
substantial change in villagers’ livelihood. In one case, some of the villagers moved to 
temporary resettlement residential housing and others still live in their own housing. 
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The construction of their new resettlement residential compound is about to be 
finished, so this split situation will come to an end soon. In another case, most 
villagers’ farming land is expropriated, but not their village, so they still live in their 
rural village without internal spatial change. At last, I focused on two resettlement 
residential compounds in the college town. One encompasses residents from one 
entire village, while the other holds people from three entire villages. In both cases, 
villagers have been relocated to their resettlement residential compounds for several 
years and both residential compounds are located in the college town. As far as time 
and location are concerned, both are eligible to my research interest in how the 
relocated villagers choose new livelihoods to adapt themselves to the urban settings 
and whether the college town project has affected the land-lost peasants in some 
specific ways. Considering that the three-village case may introduce more interesting 
dynamics, such as the interaction between villagers from different villages, I finally 
decided to choose the three-village resettlement residential compound as my field 
focus. 
Of course, my fieldwork is not just limited within the resettlement residential 
compound for following reasons. First, the materials collected in other villages 
constantly enrich my knowledge on the general situation in Chenggong and deepen 
my understanding of the situation in my case. Second, since most villagers have their 
new livelihood outside the residential compound, following their social network, I got 
to know more people and their life stories, some of which are included in my research 
data. Third, some villagers migrate to other counties to rent land and to continue 
farming, which is a special livelihood since it produces a salient group of subjects 
among land-lost peasants. In order to get to know their life and livelihood there, I also 
followed my informants to one of the counties where many land-lost peasants migrate 
as farming entrepreneurs. In that case, my field is not limited to Chenggong, either.  
I started my interviews from various scattered public spaces where people are 
likely to have more time to talk. The interviews were semi-structured, and sometimes 
they were unavoidably carried out in the form of a focus group. The good aspect of 
this is that I got to know more people and efficiently received many responses to my 
questions. At the same time, I became familiar to them and made my presence in a 
“face-to-face society” (Fei 1992:53) less strange. I found that the public space was 
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also gendered in a sense. Villagers with same gender tend to gather in the same corner. 
As a female researcher, I have no problem talking with female villagers. Meanwhile, 
my identity as an outsider allows me to transgress this unwritten rule and to sit in the 
male corner and talk to male villagers as well. By joining their discussion and 
watching their interaction, I learnt what interested them, which then affected my 
questions and the way I asked them. The disadvantage of this form is that the 
information that I acquired through this way was fragmented. People did not talk 
about their familiar persons and things in context, so I could easily get lost. In 
addition, when a person was talking, others could easily chip in. The “talking together 
at once” often left me confused in the end. Lastly, such an informal focus group could 
quickly lose focus for any distraction.  
I was thinking how I could get involved in the community as an actor instead 
of just an interviewer when I realized that the square dance was open to outsiders. 
Thus, by joining the square dance, I got to know some people whom I could 
frequently meet and get updated information from. They became my main 
interlocutors. I was very glad that I was introduced to participate in their life and 
livelihood, so I could participate in and observe lived life and connect all those 
fragmented pieces of information together to understand the logic behind them. I 
asked to participate in and experience their livelihood if it was allowed. In that case, I 
tried jobs as cleaner on campus, businessman selling fruits, village idler and migrant 
farmer. I was introduced to their family members, colleagues and relatives and 
attended family banquets. Based on the local principle of reciprocity in courtesy, my 
family and I also hosted banquets at my place and invited my villager friends. I felt 
lucky that I could actually also live with a farming entrepreneurial family on their 
farm, being treated as a family guest, and later as a family member. I participated in 
the farming and learned how to manage greenhouses. I helped cooking meals in the 
busy season and I fed dogs. I attended the farming business negotiations and observed 
how people interacted and how conflicts were solved. I was invited to participate in 
weddings, funerals and temple events, sometimes as a guest in banquets, other times, 
more importantly, as a “helper” in the kitchen. In this way I could participate in the 
social interaction in the village and understand why this particular custom is important 
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in maintaining villagers’ social network. Attending these village events thus became 
quite helpful to experience the village as a community.  
When in the field, I also collected some useful secondary data from village 
collective announcements, official reports, statistics and county annuals. 
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CHAPTER 1  From the old village to the new city: 
meeting an urban space defined by the authorities 
Chenggong as an agricultural county 
Yunnan is a southwestern frontier province of China, bordering on Tibet and Burma 
to the west, Laos and Vietnam to the south. As a mountainous and inland province, 
the economy of Yunnan is not as developed as coastal provinces such as Zhejiang and 
Guangdong in the east of China. The composition of population with abundant 
minority groups makes Yunnan exotic but also carries it a sense of distance as well as 
“backwardness” and “primitiveness” in the Chinese ideology.  
Chenggong, with an area of 461 km
2
, locates in the South of Kunming, the 
provincial capital. It is 12 kilometers away from downtown Kunming. Historically, 
Chenggong was bureaucratically defined as a county. Its history being a county can be 
traced back to 1275AD. Chenggong is officially redesignated as the sixth district of 
Kunming municipality by the central government of China in 2011. The name 
“Chenggong” is transliterated from Yi9 language, meaning “a piece of plain land near 
the gulf and with abundance of rice” [shengchan daogu de haiwan bazi] (Wu 
2006:364). A lot of archeological excavations have proved that there existed an 
ancient kingdom called Dian in Chenggong about 2,000 years ago. The sudden 
vanishing of this ancient kingdom is still mysterious to archeologists. After 
redesignation, Chenggong is comprised of 10 sub-districts [jiedao], including 65 
communities with population of 350,000 (Chenggong Online, March 9th 2012).  
Chenggong was regarded as a traditional agricultural county and 80 per cent of 
its people were peasants with 0.75 mu land per capita before the large scale land 
appropriation in 2000s (Li 2012:227). Agriculture had been the main source of 
subsistence in the county. Under the collective economy before 1980s, peasants in 
Chenggong had been engaged in traditional agriculture, growing maize and rice. After 
                                                     
9
 Yi is one of the ethnic minority groups in Yunnan. 
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China’s decollectivization 10  in 1980s, with their own contracted land and the 
legitimacy to sell the agricultural products in market, peasants in Chenggong 
attempted to grow vegetables for sale. Due to favorable climate, fertile soil and 
locational advantage, fresh vegetables, especially greenhouse vegetables from 
Chenggong were marketed in Kunming and out of Yunnan. Advanced agricultural 
technologies such as greenhouse cultivation were widely used to grow greenhouse 
vegetables. The expansion of the market constantly stimulated the formation of an 
industrial chain, which involves the provisions of transportation, fertilizers, pesticides 
and cold storages. These businesses were invested in both by local peasants with more 
capital and outside businessmen. The flourishing agricultural business attracted local 
peasants to make sufficient income from their land to quell any intention to migrate to 
far-away big cities to make a living. Most local peasants were not only the experts of 
greenhouse cultivation, but also familiar with the marketing rules.  
Growing flowers was introduced as an economic activity in Chenggong in 
1983. Soon its fresh cut flower production topped the list nationwide, seeing a ten-
year top ranking anniversary by 2011. The county government invested 3,840,000 
yuan
11
 to build the first flower trade fair in 1995. Now “Kunming International 
Flower Auction Trade Center” in Chenggong with the joint investment of 
125,000,000 yuan from both the government and enterprises is one of the biggest 
flower trade fairs in China. A mature fresh cut flower production and sales industrial 
chain has formed in Chenggong. 
                                                     
10
 Decollectivization refers to the collapse of People’s Communes established in 1958 when the 
administrative, organizational and socioeconomic structures in rural China were merged into 
communes. The decollectivization began in 1978, when the household responsibility system was 
instituted in rural China. Under the household responsibility system each household (farming family) 
contracts with the village collective to farm a certain amount of land and to deliver a certain quality of 
crops as a fee for using the land and as tax, beyond which output could be sold on the market 
(Stockman 2000:137). Households has the autonomy of land use, crops, sideline production and 
investment, although the village collective has the ownership of the land. See also Yan (1996:31). In 
Chapter 5, I will mention the decollectivization again as the third land reform in the history of socialist 
China.  
11
 Yuan, is the unit of Chinese currency. The exchange ratio of yuan to U.S. dollar was approximately 6 
to 1 in 2013. 
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In addition to vegetables and flowers, fruit cultivation has always been 
Chenggong’s tradition. Local peasants grew vegetables and flowers in their plain 
fields and made use of their forestland to cultivate fruit trees. Chenggong abounds 
with fruits, such as peaches, pears, plums, grapes and apricots. Of them, “Baozhuli” 
(baozhu pears) is nationally well-known with a long history. 
With the well-known vegetables, flowers and fruits, Chenggong was honored 
with the title of “town of flowers, fruits and vegetables” [Huaxiang, guoxiang, 
caixiang]. The blossoming agricultural industry was influenced by the disappearance 
of rural land and the agricultural production began shrinking after Chenggong was 
schemed to be a new district of Kunming in 2003. Surveys show that the plantation 
areas for vegetables, flowers and fruits were respectively 155,700 mu, 31,000 mu and 
80,000 mu in 2005, while the figures became 53 mu, 5.3 mu and 17 mu in 2011 after 
the drastic urbanization in Chenggong (Li 2012:227). 
Although Chenggong was a typical agricultural county both from the 
perspective of hukou and from the main livelihood activities of its people, its location 
near the provincial capital city set it apart from other rural counties that are situated in 
mountainous areas in Yunnan and hence isolated from the outside world due to the 
poor transport links. Villagers in Chenggong were wealthier and had easier access to 
the market. The developed industrial chain facilitated local peasants to produce 
vegetables, fruits and flowers for national market, which guaranteed a steady and 
considerable income.  
On May 20
th
 2011, the State Council approved Chenggong to be the sixth 
district of Kunming Municipality. Thus, Chenggong’ s 736-year history being a 
county came to an end. By the end of 2011, the construction of the new district 
appropriated land of 110,360 mu and seven villages were displaced, which made 
Chenggong’ s urbanization rate increase from 49.5% in 2006 to 54.2% in 2011 
(Kunming Daily May 18
th
 2011). According to Kunming’s the Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan (2001-2005), the urbanization rate of Chenggong should reach more than 75% by 
the end of 2015 (Kunming Daily May 18
th
 2011), which means urbanization in 
Chenggong will expand.  
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The three villages in the past 
Before the construction of the college town, the three villages in my fieldwork were 
adjacent to one another with North village in the north, Middle village in the East and 
South village in the west. It took about 10 to 15 minutes to walk from one to another. 
Although adjacent, there were few close associations among the three villages. Of 
course, the villagers did not expect that they would live much closer in future. North 
village has 998 villagers, while Middle village has 2,330 villagers and South village 
has 1,584 villagers. The three villages are all multi-surname villages. Village land, 
including the arable land in the flat area and the forestland on hills, were contracted 
equally to each villager after the establishment of household responsibility system 
[baochan daohu] in 1980s. Generally, one household was entitled to several scattered 
plots of various quality. The average size for each household was around five to six 
mu. Like most other peasants in Chenggong, villagers cultivated vegetables, flowers 
and fruits to sell. They accumulated both capital and experience in the market. Some 
with abundant capital also attempted to rent more land from neighboring villages to 
earn more money, but limited by the capital and local land supply, the scale was 
confined to a great degree. Mutual help between relatives and close friends in the 
village provided needed labor in busy season, therefore farmworkers were rarely hired.  
In the village, there were two distinctive styles of houses. The old style was 
made of wood and earth with a sloping tile roof and was one or two-storied. There 
was not necessarily a yard inside. Houses built after 1990s were called “new style”: 
multi-story buildings made of concrete and bricks with colored ceramic tiles pasted 
outside. The roof was flat and designed as a terrace. Some villagers designed their 
buildings hollow with an inner courtyard so as to get more light from the top. Others 
gave up the inner courtyard design for more rooms, so the extra rooms could be rented 
out for income. The number of stories was determined by the household’s economic 
status. Some families built a two-storied buildings first and built two or three more 
stories several years later when they saved enough money. The flat roof style left the 
opportunities for the family to add more stories in the future. The first floor of the 
building was strictly confined within the housing plot allocated by the village 
committee while the upper floors were extended in the air in order to get more floor 
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area. The illegal occupation of the collective land was not allowed, but to occupy the 
public space in the air seemed acceptable. This has been a popular design among rural 
villages in Chenggong. Some villagers rented out some of their spare rooms to 
outsiders who came to do small businesses in the village or to migrant workers who 
worked in nearby construction sites. The ground outside the gate was often used to 
park farm vehicles. These descriptions come from villagers. Only one family could 
provide me some photos of their old house and their old village. When asked, some 
regretted that they did not think of taking a picture as memory. My understanding 
about their old villages and past life was also intensified after I visited some other 
villages not yet expropriated in Chenggong. 
Each village used to have several public locales for villagers’ daily activities. 
For example, the “little street” [xiaojie] was one of the important locales in a village. 
It was basically a crowded village market in the morning, but still a place for villagers 
to gather at other times. Both the venders from outside and local villagers could 
simply set a stand and sell their goods. The goods were often local farm products and 
living supplies, including vegetables, meat, seasonings, clothes, sheets and kitchen 
utensils. Villagers became vendors when they had something to sell. This conversion 
seemed quite natural for peasants in Chenggong. When the early market finished after 
noon, the area would function as a playground for young people to play billiards and 
for old people to drink tea, smoke and enjoy sunshine. While the “little street” was 
tightly related to local villagers’ life and livelihood, other places scattered in the 
village, such as street corners, wells, chess and cards house, primary schools, pond, 
and grain-sunning ground, were spontaneously formed as gathering points for 
villagers to chat and exchange information. 
Villagers from the three villages became dislocated peasants between 2006 
and 2009 due to the land appropriation for constructing the college town. Their former 
land and former villages became new campuses and they were all resettled in one 
resettlement residential compound newly built on an original plot belonging to South 
village. South village was the last one dislocated among the three and so far, some of 
its villagers still do farming on some of their unappropriated land, while villagers of 
the other two villages did not have any land left. 
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The resettlement residential compound 
When peasants build their own houses, if it is not well planned, it is hard to 
avoid the problem of “urban villages”. This is particularly important for 
Chenggong in the critical period of its rapid construction of the new city. For 
that matter, through the elaborate planning, […], according to the construction 
goal of “high standard, high starting-point, high taste”, […], Chenggong 
County put an end to “urban villages” from the beginning. Therefore, they 
adopt the idea of “construction before dislocation”. The government first 
designates the construction plot and then builds the resettlement residential 
compound according to the standard and request of urban new community. […] 
It proves that this new community construction mode is undoubtedly an 
important method to eradicate “urban village” phenomenon. (Spring City 
Evening News, January 8
th
, 2009) 
The resettlement residential compound is designed and built all together by the 
government, as it is advocated in the “one-step urbanization”. Allegedly this is lesson 
learned from earlier failure elsewhere in China where the compensation package 
provided each household a housing plot on a newly appointed village housing land 
and let villagers build by themselves. The result is that they “built another urban 
village” which will become a target of demolishment in a city redevelopment project 
sooner or later. A resettlement residential compound developed exclusively by the 
government through “one-step urbanization” should meet the standard of an urban 
residential area and avoid “having to be urbanized for the second time”. Here we see 
the “discipline” force of the authorities.  
The resettlement residential compound is in a rectangular shape. There are 
about twenty rows of six-storied buildings from north to south. Each building is 
composed of two to five blocks. Each block has one staircase and there are two 
apartments at either side of the staircase on each floor. The grounds between two rows 
of buildings are green belts with grass, bushes and trees planted. Several mini parks 
are spotted among buildings with small pavilions, climbing plants covered long 
corridors, stone tables surrounded by short stone stools, or some outdoor exercising 
facilities stationed on the ground. There are three main streets inside the compound 
and each end leads to a main road outside. Two of them are parallel from north to 
south, while the third one is from west to east and across the other two in the middle. 
The entire residential compound is outlined by “straight lines and visible order” (Scott 
1998:55). As far as the layout, it is identical with other urban residential compounds 
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in the city of Kunming: buildings of uniform design, size and color, streets laid out in 
straight lines intersecting at right angles and “the whole built according to a single, 
overarching plan” (1998:55). However, as Scott argues, the geometric order in human 
settlement is most evident from above and from outside, but not at the street level 
(1998:57). This uniform and symmetry is not for the convenience of villagers or to fit 
their habit. For example, some elder villagers avoid going out alone, for they may 
have problems finding their way back or are afraid of climbing the stairs. An old 
villager in his seventies told me that he often got confused and could not find the right 
block and the right floor of his home, so that he ended up “picking other’s lock” with 
his key. The victim neighbors complained this to his son and he had to tie a red cloth 
to his apartment door, so at least his confused father would not disturb their neighbors.  
The buildings in the resettlement residential compound are given two different 
colors. About twenty buildings with yellow color standing in the far north and 
northeast are firstly built to deal with the relocation of North village in 2006. The rest 
of the buildings are in blue and built later as the second phase of the whole residential 
compound. Villagers of Middle village and South village were moved into the blue 
buildings in 2009. There is a vacant plot on the west of the compound that is reserved 
for the third phase where more apartment buildings are supposed to be built. 
According to the compensation principle for the land appropriation in 
Chenggong entitle each villager 80 m
2
 in the new resettlement residential compound. 
Each couple with only one child can obtain an extra 40 m
2
. The principle regulates 
that the total floor area that one household can get should be materialized in two 
apartments, which allows each household to have a spare apartment for rental income. 
Now the reality is that only households of the Northern village, living in the yellow 
buildings, have two apartments. Rumors among villagers of Middle village indicated 
that the dislocation in 2009 should have only involved Middle village. In that case, 
they would have enough apartment resource to guarantee that each household in 
Middle village had two apartments. However, somehow South village claimed that 
they would like to dislocate together with Middle village. “The government was 
definitely happy with that,” a villager from Middle village commented. However, that 
meant that apartments were not sufficient to fulfill the relocation. Villagers in Middle 
village refused to move. Then the government promised villagers in their relocation 
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contract that more buildings would be constructed within 18 months after their 
relocation and then each household would get their second apartment for rental 
income soon. “But the government deceived us. It has been three years since our 
relocation. The vacant plot is still there without any change,” my informants told me. I 
wondered how this delay could be allowed. “The government also has no money,” 
one villager explained: “The construction of the new city cost too much money. The 
government is under a big burden. Plus, you see there are too many corrupted officials 
in government everywhere. How can the government have money left?” Besides the 
understanding or even some sympathy towards the local state that allows the delay, 
my further fieldwork finds that the local state gives money yearly to those households 
that only have one apartment. This money is a compensation for their rental income. 
A female villager commented: “The compensation might be better than the rental 
income of an apartment with bad location. With the compensation, you don’t have to 
worry that you can’t find tenants for your apartment.” 
Many spare apartments are rented by hostel runners. A hostel runner often 
rents several apartments from different villages to run the hostel. The tenure is often 
five years or longer. The rent is just around 1,000 to 1,200 yuan for one apartment, 
but the hostel runner needs to invest some money to decorate the apartment and to buy 
furniture so that each room in it can be rented out to different customers. The daily 
rent for a room ranges from 30 to 50 yuan. These hostel runners are mostly from the 
same region in northeast Yunnan, such as Xuanwei and Huize. They have the 
reputation of being smart and good at such businesses. Being migrants, they may 
occupy one room or two in one of the apartments that they rent as their own family 
shelters, as well as the office or reception area for the hostel business.  
The main consumers of these hostel rooms are students from nearby colleges. 
Since a student has to share a dorm room with other four or six students, young 
college students have no private space to date. This near residential compound offers 
them private rooms to spend a night with their date for a low price that they can afford. 
The hostel rooms are almost all rented out on weekends. The universities also ban 
students to drink alcohol on campus. No shops on campus are allowed to sell drinks 
with alcohol. Getting caught drunk on campus can be regarded as a serious 
transgression of school discipline. In that case, the resettlement residential compound 
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provides a handy and safe place where they can enjoy themselves without being 
punished. The local police station demands hostel owners to register every customer’s 
name and identity number when they check in. This regulation influences the hostel 
business a lot. Students would not like their names registered since what they do is 
somewhat a moral violation against the traditional moral orthodoxy in China. “Some 
students would just leave, if you persisted in asking them to register. They may turn to 
other hostels run by local people. Those local hostel runners dare to violate the 
regulation. They are not afraid of the local authorities. They may be friends or know 
each other,” a hostel runner, Sister Chen told me. I got to know her at the village 
square dance. She and her husband are from Huize. They had run a hostel in Kunming 
for more than ten years, when they heard that there would be good business 
opportunities in Chenggong since many students would move to the college town. 
They started their business in the resettlement residential compound in 2009, but the 
business was not as good as they had expected. Until two years later, with more 
students moving to the college town, their business became better. The influx of 
students made the business blossom, but also brought the rise of rents, which make 
her probably reconsider her business here in future when the tenure is due. “It is safer 
to do business here. Most customers are college students. They have high suzhi 
12
 
(quality of people), which differentiate them from our former customers in Kunming 
who would even steal the pillowcase in the room,” she said. “Students are lovely,” she 
tried to give an example: “Once, several students with one of them very drunk came. 
We would not like to let them check in since we worried the drunk one would mess 
the room. They said they would like to pay extra deposit to guarantee the tidiness of 
the room. Ordinary people would never be considerate like that.” 
Some local state’s statistics in 2012 shows that there were more than 80 
hostels run in the area of North village. Hostels seldom have storefronts facing streets. 
                                                     
12
 See Kipnis (2006). Suzhi, usually glossed as quality, has become central to China’s governance, 
culture and society. The CCP claims its legitimacy in terms of producing a strong nation by 
individually and collectively raising the quality of its citizens (Kipnis 2006:296). The Chinese 
education reform, all manner of human resource decisions, various development projects can be 
justified in terms of quality. In addition to its prevalence in public discourse, the word “suzhi” is also 
widely used in people’s daily conversation in Chinese society. Based on the urban-rural dichotomy, 
rural people are seen of lower suzhi than urban people. 
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In order to attract customers, the hostel runners have to hang their tablets outside of 
the façade of buildings here and there, which makes the yellow buildings full of 
various hostel tablets and light boxes. Coupled with little shops run on the first floor 
of these buildings, the entire yellow building area appears bustling and full of 
commercial elements. These little shops are found in what used to be tool rooms 
allocated to villagers of North village. These tool rooms at the first floor are originally 
designed to let the peasants place their farming tools. Since few villagers farm near 
home, villagers from North village just rent them out to businessmen as stores and 
restaurants. All kinds of small shops, such as hairdressers, various service outlets and 
grocery stores, are run in these tool rooms. There are many small restaurants 
specializing in all kinds of flavors all over the country. Without enough space indoor, 
they often occupy the public space between two rows of buildings to set their tables. 
With catering downstairs and accommodation upstairs, the yellow building area truly 
is a commercial center inside the community. Villagers of North village have 
increased the commercial value of their apartment, but at the same time sacrificed 
their quietness of their own living area.  
In fact, the resettlement residential compound is one of the two economic hot 
zones in the college town due to its geographic location with the campus of one 
college to its north and the other on its western side. Along these two sides, the 
periphery of the compound, a commercial street has formed in this area with 
storefronts on the first floor of buildings selling clothes, stationaries, gifts on the one 
side and many red bunkhouses built on the other side rented out for all kinds of snack 
food stands selling barbecues, pancakes and fruits. The east and south sides of the 
compound are not commercial at all. The south side is faced with a newly built yet not 
used road. Further is a wasteland which used to be the old village site of South village, 
but now is full of thorns. Their village temple is still there, yet among weeds and 
thorns, only with a hidden shortcut leading to the temple from the major road. The 
east side faces a major road with much traffic but few people, since there are many 
infrastructure construction sites mapped on the other side of the road. The temporary 
village guest hall for the three villages is hidden among these construction sites.  
Compared with the yellow building area of the community, the blue building 
area is quieter and less commercialized. Without spare apartments or tool rooms to 
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boost the businesses and being relatively further from the campuses, the blue building 
area is just like other urban residential compound in Kunming except for some 
discarded farm vehicles parked on the ground between buildings. There is an 
appointed parking lot set in the southeast of the compound, but most villagers would 
like to park downstairs near their own block just as what they used to do in their old 
village. Besides private cars, the lanes in the resettlement residential compound are 
full of lorries, watering carts and tractors, which remind us that its residents may not 
be like average urbanites. There are more farm vehicles parked among the blue 
buildings in the south area where South village locates, since some of its villagers still 
farm on their unappropriated land across the major road in the east.  
Structural organization 
The residential compound is not fenced by walls. The openings between each pair of 
buildings along the road make up many entrances into the residential area. There is 
also no clear physical boundary among the three villages resettled in the residential 
compound, but apartment buildings of the same village relatively aggregate in the 
residential compound. As far as people’s daily life is concerned, the whole 
resettlement residential compound just looks like one community. Although many 
public resources necessary for their familiar rural life are reduced, or even missing in 
this urban residential area, villagers try to rebuild their former life order through 
sharing.  
For instance, traditionally, local weddings and funerals must involve a three-
day banquet in the village “guest hall” [ketang]. Every village had its own guest hall 
in the village. It is quite a rural custom, since people living in cities will treat their 
guests in a restaurant, treating only one dinner meal. Designed based on the urban 
standard, the resettlement residential compound does not contain such a locale for 
each village and there is no planned plot for that. Only South village got the chance to 
build a temporary one among some construction sites on the other side of the main 
road to the east of the compound, which the three villages share so that this important 
social interaction can continue. Meanwhile, the three-day banquet often requires the 
host family to accommodate their relatives coming from afar. When the allocated 
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apartment of the family cannot provide enough rooms, hostels run in North village 
area provide a cheap and convenient place to live.  
Just as I mentioned before, the “little street” played a very important economic 
and social role in villagers’ daily life in their old villages. It functioned as both a 
handy village fair for transactions and a public place for socializing. In the 
resettlement residential compound, a so-called “standardized food market” is set on 
the second floor of a commercial building owned by Middle village. The commercial 
building is planned and built at one intersection of the two main streets in the 
compound. The entire second floor is designed for the “standardized food market”, 
while the first floor is partitioned as several storefronts rented out for a supermarket, a 
bank and a post office. The pedestrian areas in front of the building are wide, 
especially the area around the corner, which makes this area sometimes function as a 
public square. The scale of the market is not big, with clearly demarcated booths 
rented to full-time venders annually. The market is managed with regulated opening 
and closing time and cleaned by specific personnel. The “standardization” means it is 
supposed to meet the requirements of the state’s sanctioned regulations involving site 
selection, inner settings, layout, hygiene, market management, etc. and is under the 
supervision of authorities, which implies the place is cultured or civilized. The three 
villages share the food market. It partially fulfill the function of the former “little 
street”, but it does not allow villagers’ constant conversion to venders when they have 
things to sell, nor does it provide cozy public space for villagers to socialize.  
Neither the commercial street in the northern periphery of the resettlement 
residential compound nor the “standardized” food market can substitute this 
spontaneous “little street”. One day, I was strolling in the “little street” and recognized 
that a young man who was selling fruits at his van was actually a fruit vender with a 
fixed booth at the commercial street north of the residential compound. I asked him 
why he moved here to sell his fruits. He replied: “I have no choice. People in the 
residential compound never go out to our street to buy fruits. I have to ask my wife to 
watch the booth outside in the afternoon, while I sell fruits here.” Another villager I 
met from North village told me: “I never eat anything in that street. Sometimes I 
would like to make a detour to avoid passing by that street in the evening. It is always 
suffused by cooking smoke.”  
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A new “little street” has spontaneously formed at this intersection area in front 
of the commercial building of the standardized food market. Located at the middle 
area of the entire residential compound with these public infrastructures installed and 
close to the entrance to main streets, the intersection area is the center of the entire 
community. A police station and a well-equipped kindergarten are also located near 
here. In terms of its disposition, the intersection is the economic, educational and 
administrative center of the entire residential compound. In local expression, it is a 
place with thriving renqi. People gather here day and night. In the daytime, senior 
male villagers sit around stone tables enjoying sunshine, smoking, chatting and 
playing cards. In the afternoon, villagers who have agricultural products to sell would 
sell their products just like what they did on the “little street” in their old village. In 
the evening, the square dance team of Middle village will practice their square dance 
on the empty ground in front of the commercial building. 
Interestingly, this intersection works as the “little street” in the villagers’ heart, 
but it is with an urban timing: morning is not the most bustling time for the “little 
street” anymore. Instead, the bustling time for this “little street” in the resettlement 
residential compound is in the late afternoon when most villagers working around get 
off work and go back home.  
With shared resources such as the “guest hall” and the “little street”, villagers 
from the three villages live like residents in a same rural community. However, in fact, 
the resettlement residential compound contains three self-governing communities with 
their own offices, directors and party branches respectively and run independently. I 
shall elaborate it in Chapter 2 that how each community functions as a village 
collective and in what sense the village collective identity is revived after resettlement.  
Concluding remarks 
Instead of anxiously getting rid of the stigma for rural people as backwardness 
and uncivility and abandoning their rural way of life, villagers in my field choose to 
call themselves “villagers” and consciously practice their rural tradition. Based on my 
fieldwork, I argue that villagers’ wealth accumulated from their former successful 
agricultural economy before the large-scale urbanization in Chenggong had blurred 
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the rural and urban dichotomy to some extent. Thus, when the public discourses 
objectify rural population as uncivilized and uneducated subjects in terms of the 
urban-rural dichotomy, they still have their own understanding and rationality which 
is not totally accordance with the mainstream rhetoric. In practice, people did not 
regard themselves as poor, primitive and ignorant, nor did they see their rural customs 
as “backward” which should be abandoned in pursuit of modernity. So, when the local 
state’s “one-step urbanization” scheme tries to transform villagers into urbanites 
through the “uniformly planned and constructed modernized residential compound”, 
they challenge this imposed urban spatiality with their own spatial logic.  
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CHAPTER 2  Engaging a new urban universe: 
reviving “the village” 
Relocation brings deterritorialization via three mechanisms. First, relocation 
prompts a process of economic deterioration, a downward movement that 
deprives those relocated of economic opportunities and income sources. Second, 
relocation creates and widens rifts within the village, accelerating the social and 
organizational disintegration of the collective; the disintegration is furthered by 
policies of selective conversion of villagers into urban residents. Third, 
relocation opens rifts among villagers, impeding their collective 
reterritorialization at the new relocation site. (Hsing 2010:191) 
In many urbanization cases, the relocation may cause the rupture of the village 
collective identity (Hsing 2010, Chen 2007). However, in my case, my fieldwork 
suggests that the village collective identity is strengthened after the relocation.  
In the 2000s, as many rural labors have joined the “floating population” and 
migrate to cites, many villages in rural areas have become “empty villages” with only 
elderly villagers and children left. The village collective is paralyzed while villagers 
resemble a “heap of loose sand” without community sense or concern over the 
development of their village (Chen 2007:164). Villagers in Chenggong seem to have 
had less interest to join the “floating population” and make a living in big cities. Local 
villagers do not appreciate jobs far away from home. Neither when they were peasants 
with land nor now. In case of Middle village, the village statistics shows that among 
2,330 villagers, less than ten of them worked outside Yunnan Province between 2006 
and 2010. I got to know an “older sister” from the village square dance. She is in her 
forties but unemployed due to illness. Her husband works in a campus gardening team. 
Their only son graduated from a private computer school in Kunming and just found a 
job in a big city in Sichuan, a neighboring province north to Yunnan. Each time we 
met, we talked about her son. She kept asking me whether it was good for her son to 
work outside the province and obviously expected a positive answer. I regarded it a 
showing-off from a proud mother, but later I realized that it was because she could not 
get the recognition from her fellow villagers. Villagers are skeptical about working 
out far away, which is against the usual case of most Chinese villages as many are 
practically emptied for everyone but seniors and children. The attitude in Chenggong 
is that capable men can earn money locally. Besides a few people continue farming in 
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neighboring counties, most villagers choose to make a living just in or near the 
college town. Most interviewees claimed that they would prefer jobs with more 
freedom, so they could have time to take care of their family. Their definition of 
“taking care of their family” has a broader meaning as my fieldwork reveals and is not 
just limited to the realm of household chores. In most cases, it is related to things like 
“help offering” (mutual assistance) within their social networks of trust and 
reciprocity, especially on important events such as funerals and weddings. “I hate to 
work for those private bosses. They supervise you in work and push you to keep 
working intensively through the working hours. Moreover, it is hard to ask for a leave 
when you have things to do,” a male villager from North village told me. People seem 
quite comfortable with jobs on the campuses as cleaners and gardeners, which do not 
involve a lot of intensive work and allow flexibility with time and management 
control. These types of jobs make it easy to change the shifts with colleagues when a 
person is needed in collective events without having to disturb the manager. This 
makes villagers think that they still enjoy much freedom.  
I argue that the local tradition and custom of willing to work near home is 
influential to the reinforcement of the village collective of a relocated villages, while 
it is also largely established by the relocation compensation policy. First, the entire 
village is relocated in the resettlement residential compound under the guideline of the 
“one-step urbanization” which retains the intactness of the village and provides the 
sufficient condition for the restoration of the village collective. Second, the cash 
compensation policy institutionalizes the economic recollectivization of the village 
collective, which consequently brings about a power recentralization of village cadres. 
Besides these two favorable conditions associated with the local governance, the local 
tradition of seeking employment nearby is also vital to prevent the decollectivization 
of the village.  
Let us look at the dynamic of the compensation package. The way the 
compensation is divided into collective and individual parts promotes both a 
collective process and a more individual approach. Villagers are compensated 
according to national law as interpreted locally. The three villages share a similar 
compensation package. The cash compensation mainly derives from the expropriated 
farmland of the village. The policy stipulates that: ten per cent of the cash 
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compensation must be kept as collective fund, which is noticeably important as the 
initiative pooling of resources for the later village corporatism (see Hsing 2010:122); 
the remaining part of the cash compensation is distributed to each villager 
autonomously decided in terms of intra-village procedures. Aside from the lump sum 
income of cash compensation, there are some commercial buildings and a few plots 
around the resettlement residential compound. They are distributed to each village 
collective as collective assets for commercial lease. Ten per cent of the profit of the 
rent is stored as a collective fund and the rest is evenly distributed to each villager. 
For instance, North village obtained a rental income from its collective assets 
amounting to 3,000,000 yuan in total in 2012. The village collective reserved 300,000 
yuan (ten per cent) as collective fund and distributed the rest. Thus, each villager in 
North village got 2700 yuan as dividend in that year. Therefore, each village works as 
a share-holding company and the village collective’s role as dispenser of dividends is 
greatly strengthened. In fact, a formal share-holding company is formed at the level of 
the sub-district. Like other villages under the jurisdiction of the sub-district, the three 
villages were asked to invest in a “land-lost peasants entrepreneurial base” [shidi 
nongmin chuangye jidi] project. The project developed a commercial plaza in the 
college town with shopping, dining and entertainment all together. By doing so, a 
symbiotic relationship (Weber and Zhao 2010:69) has formed between the relocated 
villagers and urbanization – the faster the pace of urban development and the higher 
renqi, the more rental income and the higher value of the invested real estates. In the 
official discourse, this is “letting the land-lost peasants sharing the benefit of 
urbanization”. As the representative as well as manager, the Residents’ Committee 
(village committee) is empowered with the restoration of economic control. 
Apart from cash compensation, each household is given one relocation 
apartment for private use to compensate for its house removal and one apartment for 
lease, which I have discussed in Chapter 1. In sum, we have seen that the villager’s 
income source is multiple: their private rental income, the dividend of the collective 
properties, the potential dividend of the collective investment project (yet nothing so 
far) and their own work. The entitlement to all this is decided by the identity of being 
a member of the village.  
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What is at work here is hukou, the household registration system. Generally in 
China, due to the urban-rural asymmetry, people with urban hukou are covered by the 
national welfare system and have more access to public resource, such as medical care 
and pension payments. A common sense for contemporary Chinese people is “no 
matter what, better to have an urban hukou.” This became an important condition of 
spouse selection after the depoliticization
13
 of Chinese society since 1980s. Having a 
rural hukou is quite negative for a potential spouse. Given a chance, savvy rural 
villagers would transfer their rural hukou to an urban resident’s hukou. There are three 
conventional channels to realize this urban dream: through higher education, being a 
private teacher [minban jiaoshi] and joining the army. In the past, villagers in 
Chenggong apparently did not have great motivation to change their rural hukou due 
to the prosperous agriculture and locational advantage. There were several exceptional 
cases found in my fieldwork where people got an urban hukou, but now they asked to 
restore their former village hukou. 
Qiaohui had been a private teacher teaching in a local elementary school in 
Chenggong for many years before she got a chance to be finally transferred to be a 
public teacher with urban hukou. When her daughter was born, Qiaohui let her 
daughter follow her registration as an urban resident without hesitation. However, 
when the village land was expropriated for the college town construction, without 
legal villager identity, both of them were excluded from the compensation package 
and the village collective dividend. Qiaohui and several other fellow villagers who 
were in a similar situation applied to transfer their hukou back to the village. I could 
image how hard that could be since I already heard that the village had severe 
restrictions on registering an outsider as a village member. Childbirth and marriage 
are the only normal ways to include a new member. In the case of marriage, the 
spouse from outside can register a village hukou free of charge. However, if the 
villager gets divorced and the new marriage also involves a similar immigration, then 
the new couple will be charged something like 100,000 yuan or 150,000 yuan to 
register a village hukou. Villagers are serious about the regulation, since more people 
                                                     
13
 Depoliticization refers to the post-Mao era when “class” and “class struggle” are downplayed. In this 
time, the urban-rural dichotomy coined by hukou system came to the front. People with urban hukou in 
place of with advanced class background (worker or poor peasant) are favored.  See also Yang 
(2010:552). 
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joining with prior links to the village would decrease the amount that each person can 
get. Luckily for Qiaohui and others, the community residents’ committee (village 
committee) approved their requests. Qiaohui seemed not to be willing to tell many 
details to me, but I guess her and her daughter’s luck might come from the fact that 
both her husband and a close relative are cadres in the village committee and that the 
luck of the other applicants also was related to the fact that they happened to apply 
with Qiaohui and her daughter. 
In another case we find, Daqiang, a man in his late twenties who joined the 
army years ago, but who recently was urged by his family to quit and get married 
immediately, so that the family would have chance to add his name to the list and thus 
be entitled more square meters, be allocated a second apartment and entitled more 
collective dividend in the future. Although my fieldwork suggests that local villagers 
usually get married quite early (approximately around the early twenties), the pending 
second apartment may accelerate the trend towards early marriages and consequently 
bring about a “baby boom”. Likewise, senior villagers are no longer seen as a family 
burden since they bring profit to the family according to the hukou policy.  
The revivified village director position 
The image of village cadres kept changing in the eyes of their fellow villagers.  At the 
time before the tax-for-fee reform in 2002 and the repeal of the agricultural tax 
afterwards, since the village cadres’ workload was limited to urge villagers to pay tax 
to the state and their own salary was actually drawn from the village revenue, they 
were often perceived to extort money from their fellow villagers for their own salaries. 
Cadres at the village level are not state civil servants and are not placed on the state 
payroll. After the repeal of the agricultural tax, village finances became more 
dependent on subsidies from townships, so village cadres thus were seen as beggars 
having to ask for money from the township officials all the time. Both realities made 
villagers lose interest to run for the position of village cadres. However, the unwanted 
position became popular after the urbanization in Chenggong. “Before the land 
appropriation, everybody was busy earning their own money. Nobody would like to 
be elected as an unpopular director. After the land appropriation, however, they broke 
their necks to compete for the position,” villagers told me. We have already hinted at 
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the explanation for this. According to the compensation policy, ten per cent of the 
land compensation cash must be reserved as the village collective fund, while the rest 
of it is equally divided to each villager. Being elected as cadres gives access to the 
village collective fund. There are also some collective housing properties built in and 
around the resettlement residential compound that can be used to obtain operating 
income. Also, in some cases, the relocated village still has some hilly area left. These 
areas were contracted to villagers before the relocation, but now the areas belong to 
the village collective as operating property, and anyone including the villagers needs 
to pay rent to farm on them. The rent also becomes part of the collective fund. The 
access to all these types of collective wealth lies with the cadres, a fact that has 
brought new interest in the position as village cadres, especially as the director of the 
community.  
In principle, every villager can be a candidate, but in practice only those with 
economic capital can win. They themselves are entrepreneurs. After the 
depoliticization in China, economic status replaces class status (landlords, peasants, 
workers and cadres) as a new orientation for social status in market economy. 
Economic success brings prestige among villagers. Certain economic capital, social 
capital and symbolic capital are vital for a successful business as well as for the 
competition of a political position in village election. In order to win the election, the 
competitive candidates “bribed” their fellow villagers to vote for him (in most cases 
candidates are male). The bribe varies from banqueting their fellow villagers in 
restaurants, entertaining them in KTVs, and more directly, giving them gift money. In 
some cases, a vote was attached a marked price tag by candidates. For example, a 
voter would get 400 yuan if he or she agrees to vote for some candidate in a local 
village election. I heard that in an election a candidate spent 1,000,000 yuan in 
Chenggong. More importantly, this makes villagers constantly suspect their village 
cadres of embezzling collective funds in some way even though the village committee 
posts the collective revenue and expenditure every quarter at the community’s bulletin 
board to show the transparency of the village accounting. “At least, they have to 
recover the cost that they spent in the election,” a villager said. 
It is also believed that only those who are both rich and keep a good 
relationship with the township (sub-district) level officials can work as a director. The 
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previous image of the politically well-connected village head is giving way to a new 
one with demonstrated business skills and personal networks who is an entrepreneur 
(Tsai 2002:6). Their accumulated economic capital and social capital are necessary 
for the competition of this political position. The political capital conferred by 
officialdom brings opportunities to extend their social network and the possibility of 
benefits such as tax breaks for their enterprises induce business people to take a turn 
as a village cadre (2002:6). Social capital does not only come from the support of the 
higher level of the political hierarchy, but also relies on the horizontal networks at the 
village level. In order to win supporters and allies, the director needs to maintain a 
good guanxi with his fellow villagers. Guanxi can be naturally built based on kinships, 
but also come from other relationships such as former classmates or childhood friends. 
Whatever its base is, guanxi needs to be consistently cultivated and often involves 
long-term engagements (Yan 1996:10). Villagers tend to vote for those who have a 
good guanxi with them, assuming this person will, when elected, give maximum 
“convenience” to them when called upon. The elected person is intended to do so to 
accumulate his own social capital and symbolic capital for his next election. In that 
case, the public election and collective resources are redefined in this private guanxi 
network for various private interests. “Our village leaders can earn their salary by 
sunbathing outside their office,” a villager commented about the workload of their 
village cadres now. Allegedly, in his village, the competition is less intense since the 
number of qualified candidates is small. The director has been reelected three times, 
but he still treats and gives gift money to his potential voters every time in order to 
maintain and re-establish this patron-client relationship (see Yan 1992:21).  
Zhuxian, a cleaner in a university, told me how their director spent a lot of 
money buying votes in the election, how he took the whole guest hall of the next 
village to banquet his associates and well-connected personnel, including some upper 
sub-district leaders and how he personally invested several million yuan to run an 
entertainment locale in the college town. Many villagers suspected him of 
misappropriating their collective fund. “Nobody tries to report his corruption to the 
upper levels of the government?” I asked. “He is not afraid of being reported. They 
might have known it. One day when I was helping my husband watch the fruit stand, 
two official-looking men came to me. They pretended to buy fruits but asked about 
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our director’s buying votes in the election,” she continued with pride for her own 
shrewd at that moment: “I told them I knew nothing about it. They must have been 
sent by the higher-ups to investigate him.”  
Even if the distrust of the village cadres was quite widespread and apparent, 
few substantial conflicts erupted. Villagers may not avoid talking and complaining 
about the cadres’ corruption in daily conversation, but my fieldwork shows some 
issues should not be omitted. First, many villagers are kinsmen of their villager cadres 
either by kinship or by marriage. The connection can cover many generations and is 
intended to be remembered. The complicated relationship net was vividly 
metaphorized as “entangled melon vine and bean vine” by one of my informants. In 
that case, every villager might get some benefit or “convenience” from his or her 
cadres, which made most villagers think of themselves as members of the “privileged” 
group and thus became more tolerable to the cadres’ corruption. Second, the cadres 
maintain this patron-client relationship for both advancing their social capital and 
symbolic capital for the next election and thus guaranteeing stability, all in order to 
avoid dismissal from their posts (Chen 2007:165). Third, with villagers less involved 
into the decision-making body, the information-asymmetry makes any disclosure of 
irregularities hard. The complaints remain just rumors when lacking hard proofs. 
Fourth, the control over the village cadres are much loosened in market economy, 
which compels the regime to turn a blind eye to what is going on (Chen 2007:157). 
The different administrative Residents’ Committees and common wealth that 
can be shared differentiate villagers of one village to those of another. The bulletin 
boards of each village will put up announcements for village events respectively, 
including the granting of dividend and subsidies, the free medical check for elderly 
villagers and announcements of the winning bidders of collective storefronts. Each 
village has some autonomy to manage their territory in the resettlement residential 
compound. The territorialization of their own living space is embodied in some 
practical things. For example, instead of introducing a third-party estate management 
company to organize the cleaning, greening and guarding jobs, each of the three 
Residents’ Committees hire some of their own villagers to take care of these things. 
Their salary will be drawn from the collective fund. Moreover, the committee has the 
right to operate the collective properties, such as storefronts, to obtain operational 
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income. Ten per cent of the income is reserved for the collective fund, and the rest is 
allocated to every villager equally. This is a rudimentary form of a shareholding 
company.  These matters are all directly related to the village’s territorial autonomy 
under metropolitan governance. The committee can also decide the usage of the 
collective fund. For example, whether to grant 100 yuan or 150 yuan to each senior 
villager over 60 on the Seniors’ Day. The usage of the fund is largely determined by 
the opinion of the director. In that case, as the leader of the village, the director also 
has more authority. The function of the village or community as a collective is 
reinforced by all these changes and the collective cohesiveness is strengthened 
primarily through the shared economic interest.  
However, the autonomy of the village is not unlimited. The “self-governance” 
implies that “the community is expected to manage its own affairs within the 
operational parameters established by government authorities” (Bray 2006:543).  For 
instance, the three villages were asked to use their reserved collective cash 
compensation for land appropriation to invest in a sub-district’s development project. 
The project aimed at developing a business plaza named “land-lost peasants 
entrepreneurial base” in the college town in 2011. Each village as shareholders can 
get a dividend of the profit. The business plaza has been running for two years, but 
villagers complain that they have got nothing yet. Villagers blame the recession of the 
plaza for the lack of renqi in the college town. The local state’s aim of including the 
land-lost peasants in the benefit of the urbanization also confronts them with the 
uncertainty and risk of the “new city”. Now villagers can only expect the promotion 
of renqi in Chenggong. 
Three photos, three important kinships 
In the old Chenggong we also see that families have maintained relationships in ways 
that migration processes in other parts of China have destroyed. One example is 
Shaohua. Shaohua is in his early twenties and is one of the college students in Middle 
village. He used his summer holiday time to work as a waiter in a restaurant run in the 
“land-lost peasants entrepreneurial base”. When I interviewed two women who 
worked in that restaurant, he voluntarily came to join us. I was glad to find that he 
happened to come from one of my fieldwork villages. He and his parents lived in an 
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apartment on the first floor in one of the blue buildings. When invited to his home, I 
was impressed by a large picture displayed in the living room. The picture is one and 
a half meter long with about 60 people involved. That is his entire four-generation 
patrilineal family. The eldest generation only includes his grandmother, while the 
youngest generation includes several of his nephews and nieces. Shaohua’s father, in 
his forties, has seven siblings and the family could have been bigger if the one-child 
policy had not implemented. That large “all in the family” photo impressed me a lot 
since I had not seen a big family like this for a long time in the urban context. In most 
cases, even if I know that there exists a big family like this, it is quite rare for the 
family members to be able to gather, since they can be living here and there, rural or 
urban, at home or abroad, scattered all over the world. Actually, one young guy from 
the family also missed this photo taken. Shaohua told me that he joined the army and 
could not come back. “But he sent back his identity photo, so we asked the photo 
studio to insert him right here.” Thanks to the modern technology and the persistence 
of the family, no one is missing in this photo. Together with this large “all in the 
family”, there are other two enlarged photos preserved in glass frames standing on 
either side of the TV. One includes Shaohua’s nuclear family and his grandma; the 
other is Shaohua with all his male cousins on his father’s side. Shaohua explained that 
besides the big family (extended family) photo, each “small family” (extended family 
started from the generation of Shaohua’s father) took a photo respectively with the 
grandma and then senior members insisted that as the new backbone of the family, all 
the male members in his generation should take a picture together. With my further 
knowledge about his family and the village, the three photos just well represent a 
basic social network in a local village, which highlights kinship, family and the 
brotherhood of “the same generation or age group” (Yan 2009: xxv). These three 
primary relationships make and remake villagers in their post-relocation life and 
livelihood (about this I will elaborate below and also in the following chapters). 
Shaohua’s mother died when he was young and his father remarried. His 
grandmother on his birth mother’s side “adopted” his stepmother and let her take her 
deceased daughter’s place, so the broken connection between the two families was 
artificially reestablished. As a person not blood-related, Shaohua’s stepmother 
addressed his grandmother “mother” and she was addressed as “sister” or “aunt” by 
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other members of that family. When the family held funerals or weddings, Shaohua’s 
whole family would also be invited, as if there was no change at all.  
This is a somewhat extreme case, but it is not in any way an exceptional case 
of how local villagers value the kinship bond and smartly find their ways to remake it 
in that they believe that a big family can guarantee its members a wide social network 
which potentially contributes to the accumulation of social capital and the social 
capital someday may convert to other forms of capital benefitting all the family 
members. Shaohua’s experience reminds me of many urban versions of this kind of 
story which often repeats the Snow White plot telling how the evil stepmother tortures 
the poor child. While put in the frame of a big extended family, the story becomes 
how the wise grandmother manages to maintain the kinship network and even actually 
enlarges it. 
Although the change of the residential mode (from self-built houses with 
sufficient  space for stem family or even extended family to live together to 
apartments with limited area) and the corresponding allocation policy (one household 
can be entitled two apartments) facilitates nuclearization of the family, i.e. the gradual 
replacement of the traditional extended family by the smaller unit of a couple with 
unmarried children which has long been regarded as a global trend in the 
modernization of the family institution (Yan 2009: xxiii), my fieldwork suggests that 
these changes do not make people distant from each other. In fact, some villagers I 
interviewed even feel that their kinship bonds become reinforced after the land 
appropriation. This might be another unintended consequence. First, cash 
compensation partly reduced conflicts caused by hair-splitting among relatives. 
“Since each family has some savings at hands, we don’t make a fuss about tiny things. 
I find relatives become more easy-going,” a villager told me. Second, without much 
pressure on subsistence, villagers have more time to mingle. Earlier, when having 
their own lands to tend, villagers were supposed to be busy on farming. Frequent 
gathering and chatting were seen as being lazy or fooling around. Now they seem to 
have the opportunity to slow down without worrying about the immediate shortage of 
money. Third, relatives are reliable to provide useful information and substantial help 
when a person wants to invest in a new livelihood, such as renting land in other 
counties to continue farming, which I will elaborate in Chapter 4. 
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The guest hall, a reestablished rural reciprocal system 
One effect of the attempts to maintain the realm of the extended family is seen in the 
importance of significant banquet events for weddings and funerals. There are two 
significant locales that tie villagers of each village together and impress them about 
their villager identity. They are the guest hall and the village temple.  
Each village must have a guest hall in the village. It is a local convention in 
rural Chenggong. When a family in the village has a wedding or a funeral, the family 
is supposed to banquet relatives and friends in the village guest hall for three days, 
including three big lunches and big suppers. Most guests are local, mainly from the 
same village. The number of guests varies but often reaches several hundreds, and can 
involve about one third or half of the village population. So when a family holds an 
event like this, it is more like a village festival, bringing people together. Invited 
families can save the cooking time at home and go out to mingle with others within 
the three days. As for those who are invited to help in the guest hall, they are happily 
socializing with one another while working. The kitchen of the guest hall can be busy 
but also full of laughter. 
To invite helpers is very necessary. The village guest hall is just a locked 
building at times without full-time chefs or servants. It is constructed as a big 
bungalow with a kitchen. The big bungalow is the hall for banquets. Several tens of 
wooden tables with chairs or benches around are set in the hall. The area of the 
bungalow varies according to the population of the village and other economic and 
geographic conditions. Since the guest hall banquet does not involve any ritual or 
ceremony, it is not a big problem if the hall is too small to accommodate all the guests 
at the same time. No precise time stipulates the beginning and ending of the banquet. 
No seats are reserved, either. Guests assemble and sit together wherever they want at 
each meal. When seeing the table is full, waiters will immediately serve the rice and 
dishes. After eating, if the guests leave, their table can be cleaned and reset for 
newcomers. If the guests of a table favor some dish, they can specifically ask for 
another portion from waiters or just send someone to get it from the kitchen. The 
guests literally “help themselves” and “enjoy themselves” in the banquet in ways that 
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will never happen in an urban banquet which is often held in a restaurant where guests 
are supposed to act as guests.  
Since the banquet lasts for three days, many ingredients should be prepared or 
even be half cooked ahead of time. Cold weather favors the preservation of the 
ingredients, so local custom is to hold the wedding ceremonies in the winter months. 
Paradoxically, cold weather cools down the cooked dishes quickly, so the kitchen 
must also include a big rectangular pit furnace [dilu] used to keep unserved dishes 
warm in the kitchen. The operation in such a kitchen and the arrangement of the 
banquet are tricky but full of life. It leaves the local “specialists” with a lot of 
opportunity to combine their special skills with story telling that create a good 
atmosphere. 
These “specialists” are “helpers” invited by the host family. They are selected 
from the guest families. All the crew including the cooks, waiters and waitresses all 
work under the command of the chef [dachu] who is the leading figure in the guest 
hall. Any host family tends to invite a capable chef with good reputation to help. 
When the chef agrees to help, the host family just needs to tell him the number of 
guests and the budget, and the chef will arrange and take care of the following things. 
He decides the dishes for each meal and commands the temporarily organized 
culinary team working together. A chef needs considerable social and symbolic 
capital to motivate his randomly organized staff to listen to him, as he instructs them 
in their work such as preparing materials and ingredients, arranging the guest hall, 
cooking, serving the food and finally cleaning the kitchen and the guest hall for next 
use. Chefs are not professional, either. They are ordinary villagers at time, but they 
also have this special skill by interest or by chance. In many cases it is a family 
tradition. The skill can be handed down from the older generations of the family. 
None of the helpers are paid. They may be invited for an extra meal at the end, 
but that may be also for consuming the leftovers. The host family may give some gifts 
such as two cartons of cigarettes to appreciate the chef, which by no means conforms 
to the market prices of rented expert help as far as the value of the gift is concerned. 
No one from the host family deliberately stays in the guest hall to supervise the work. 
Helpers are supposed to take care of everything just as they deal with their own affairs. 
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The help implies a close guanxi between the host family and the helper’s family and 
also a mutual trust. According to the local custom, a family should banquet guests 
[qingke] in the village guest hall for both weddings and funerals. When corresponding 
rites are carried out in the host’s home, banquets are held in the guest hall. The host 
family and the close relatives are busy with rites, leaving the helpers take care of all 
the affairs in the guest hall for them. The process of working together is also 
important for each helper to display his/her capability comprehensively in front of 
his/her fellow villagers, therefore winning prestige, such as being a capable man, 
diligent, good at cooking, very social or funny. Nobody would ruin the chance of 
displaying their competence and personal skills in front of their fellow villagers. In 
Bourdieu’s terms, villagers obtain symbolic capital by winning prestige and 
accumulate social capital by enlarging their social network through the corporation 
and concrete tasks (Bourdieu 1986). 
The helper team can be seen as an extended kinship network of the host family, 
which we may regard as friends, but it is not quite the same. The concept of friendship 
is not highly stressed among villagers. The help offered is based on reciprocity, as 
well as an established close connection (good guanxi), which involves both moral 
obligations and emotional attachments (Yan 2009: xxxiv). The number of helpers 
invited shows the volume of the host family’s social capital. It is not a shame to ask 
for such help, instead, a host family may intend to ask more people than needed to 
show off and to get prestige of having face[mianzi]. It is not economic capital that is 
displayed, but social capital and symbolic capital.  
Those, who seldom get involved in these village-based activities gradually 
withdraw from this reciprocal system and would feel embarrassed to invite helpers 
from within the village. In my fieldwork, I heard villagers talk about a family in such 
a situation. The family ended up paying daily wage to hire helpers from other villages 
in the guest hall. Instead of admiring their consideration, villagers felt sorry for them. 
In another case, a host family banqueted guests for their daughter’s wedding in 
Chenggong’s most famous restaurant just as an urban wedding. But instead of having 
one banquet, they banqueted guest twice in the restaurant (probably trying to follow 
the local custom of three-day banquet in some sense). Their generosity was not quite 
admired. Villagers sanctioned this breach of custom by calling the girl and her family 
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tuhao. Tuhao is a new buzzword in China, which just became popular since 
September 2013, but was soon widely used through internet and other social media. 
To say someone is tuhao is to imply that they come from a poor peasant background, 
and have made it rich quick – but without quite having the manners or sophistication 
to go along with it (BBC News, October 31th 2013). The word is similar to “bling” or 
“nouveau riche” in English, but it is also an old word in Chinese. It was widely used 
between 1920s and early 1950s to refer to landlords and gentry who would bully poor 
peasants. Later, these people became “class enemies” that should be “beaten down” in 
the communist revolution. Reappearing in the late-socialist China, it reflects a mixed 
emotion of sneer and jealousy. When used by villagers, it indicates that villagers felt 
that the family should not have shown off their wealth in this way. In general, 
although generous, this different wedding banquet was not appreciated by villagers.  
Each event happening in the guest hall reestablishes the host family’s close 
relationship with the guests and the helpers. It is a presentation of the family’s social 
network. A successful presentation may strengthen and increase host family’s social 
and cultural capital. At the same time, the large number of village members involved 
give villagers more chances to imagine it as a collective gathering and reunion, which 
helps to shape the villager identity from the same village collective. Those who work 
out or marry out of the village get a chance to come back eating or working with their 
fellow villagers within the three days, catching up on social affairs and maintaining 
their local social network. Although the helper team is mainly composed of competent 
adults, some young people are encouraged to learn to accomplish some simple tasks 
within it. To offer help and to work with other adult villagers socialize them into the 
rural community. The interaction within the guest hall is an important socialization 
and is vital for villagers produce and reproduce themselves out of their rural tradition.  
However, I should make clear again that the design of the resettlement 
residential compound does not include a guest hall. This underlines the fact that the 
authorities might not hold such traditional and communal activities in high regard. 
Nevertheless, people improvise. At the time of fieldwork, the three villages share one 
guest hall with the property right of South village. Each household who needs to use it 
pays some rent to South village. The guest hall thus is an investment and earns rental 
revenue for the village collective fund. However, this guest hall is simply built as a 
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non-permanent construction with some shelters on the top as roof and half-built walls 
on a vacated lot among construction sites. This is so because the land is state-owned 
after appropriation, but there is not specific development projects going on here. 
Permission would not be granted if the building were permanent because the land 
formally belongs to the state. The non-permanent character of the guest hall suggests 
that it will be demolished immediately if the state retrieves the land for any specific 
development project. It is based on this consensus that the state turned a blind eye to it. 
Rumor also said that South village had used some guanxi to finally get the permission. 
No matter in what sense, both the guest hall and the fate of this local tradition may be 
temporary.  
During my fieldwork, I also observed another case relating to the village guest 
hall in the college town. In that case, the resettled village firstly used the space 
between two apartment buildings to build a non-permanent bungalow as their village 
guest hall in the residential compound as soon as they resettled. However, villagers 
complained that the guest hall was narrow and with poor settings. Then the Residents’ 
Committee transformed an underground parking lot in the residential compound to a 
new village guest hall. I witnessed the first banquet held in their new guest hall. The 
guest hall is bright and finely-decorated with tall and decent gate. The kitchen is 
conveniently divided into several working sections with electrified devices. Of course, 
most important, a pit furnace is included. Built in the resettlement residential 
compound under the autonomy of the village, hopefully this guest hall will have 
different fate.  
The village temple 
Different from the guest hall, village temples are nearly abandoned and faded out of 
people’s vision after relocation. Traditionally, each village in Chenggong has at least 
one small temple for local religion. The temple is built in the village and its porch 
often functions as a public space for villagers to sit and chat. The gate of the temple is 
open all year around and there are always pilgrims coming and going. When the 
temple holds the annual Buddhist ceremony in Decembers, villagers will gather in the 
temple offering incense to Buddha, donating merits and praying for peace and good 
fortune in the coming year. The temple provides two vegetarian meals on that day. 
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Villages can spend a little money to buy a ticket and eat there. The ticket for each 
meal is just several yuan.  
Village temples show different predicaments in the process of land 
appropriation and relocation. In my case, North village lost its temple, while temples 
of Middle and South villages’ were kept since they had already been designated as 
county-level cultural relics. Although the two temples were kept, they were distant 
from the villagers since they became “placed” outside of the resettlement residential 
compound. In the first month of my fieldwork, I was very interested to look at the 
temples that were still kept. However, villagers I talked with asserted firmly that I 
could not find them and I should not try without any company. Later, I finally 
persuaded my informants to take me to see them. Then I realized what they meant. 
There were no proper roads leading to the temples. They were actually located in the 
middle of nowhere among piles of earth more than three meters. Both temples were 
locked and nothing could be seen from the outside. Therefore, I was very glad that I 
had chance to attend Middle village’s annual temple event before I had to finish my 
fieldwork. 
I read the tiny poster about this event on the village bulletin board, but I was 
worried that I could not find that place alone. Luckily, Shaohua called and said that he 
and his village buddies planned to join it, and I was welcomed to go with them. 
Twelve of us, driving two cars headed to the village temple at lunchtime. Shaohua’s 
village buddies were young men in their twenties like him. They grew up together, but 
Shaohua was the only college student among them. Shaohua was enrolled by one of 
the universities in the college town, so he could live both on campus and at home. 
Although making new friends in college, he still kept a close relationship with these 
former buddies. Our cars lingered on the roads for quite some time, first for locating 
the position of the temple and later for struggling to approach it after we could see the 
roof peak behind a tall earth pile. The temple turned out to be walled on a university 
campus and our cars needed to pay to go through the university gate. 
The temple was composed of several brick houses with tiled roofs. Wooden 
short tables surrounded by eight stools were set both in the yard and under cloisters of 
the temple. Many villagers already sat and ate. Female villagers prepared meals in the 
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kitchen of the temple. They also worked as waitresses. They came voluntarily. “It is 
for your own sake to come and help in the temple. Buddha will bless you,” a female 
helper said to me. It reflected a reciprocal relationship but this time it is between 
people and their gods. The temple was composed of three shrines. I could recognize 
that the god of fortune and the god of reproduction resided respectively in two side 
shrines, but I was not sure about the gods worshiped in the main shrine. I tried to ask 
some female helpers. They did not seem to know, either. The person presiding in the 
main hall was female. She conducted people to kneel and worship batch by batch. Her 
prayer for every batch was with the same words, praying for peace and good fortune, 
but I was surprised to find that her prayer even included the youngsters’ winning 
when they played Mahjong, a popular Chinese gambling game. When it is played as a 
gambling game, it is prohibited by law. I just heard that the police sealed up some 
underground Mahjong gambling houses in the residential compound. But gambling in 
villagers’ eyes is evidently not as evil as in the state’s view, and hence it could be 
“blessed”.  
When we sat down around a table, several middle aged women served the 
dishes and rice immediately. The rule was similar to the one in the guest hall. The 
waitresses came to ask us if we wanted something more from time to time. The 
temple did not provide liqueur, but eaters were allowed to drink. I saw some men 
bring their own liqueur and drink together happily. Shaohua told me that the temple 
event was not as crowded as the time when the temple was in the village.  
The temple is locked at times and the devout in the village keep the key. They 
come to offer incense on the first and the middle day of each lunar month. Men in the 
villages regard it as a women’s thing. Some said that it was feudalistic superstition 
and only ignorant old women were keen on it. The annual temple event is not 
exclusively just for villagers of Middle village. Villagers from other villages are 
welcomed to join. The female helper I talked with worked on campus as a cleaner. 
She said she also invited students whom she knew to come and play in the annual 
event. “But I don’t see them today. Our temple is just opposite to their campus. 
Maybe they can’t find the way to walk in,” she said with a little disappointment.  
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Although the religious activity of the temple faded from villagers’ daily life, 
the annual temple event at least is still an opportunity to gather villagers, but now 
probably with more social meaning than with religious meaning.  
Square dance 
The square dance [guangchangwu] is a popular female activity in the resettlement 
residential compound. Each village has their own square dance team and all the 
dancers are female. As a national fitness exercise it has been prevailing for years in 
towns and cities in China. Dancers are mainly retired female citizens older than 55. 
The age of 55 is the legal retirement age for women, while men retire at 60. After 
retirement, senior female citizens often choose to join a square dance team. It can be 
just in their residential compound or in a public park. The time is either in the early 
morning or in the evening after dinner. The activity can be organized in every corner 
in towns and cities where recently media reported more and more conflicts happening 
between the senior dancers and their neighbours. The noisy sound produced by the 
sound equipment is often a source of complaints.  
Female villagers began to practice the square dance after they were relocated 
to the resettlement residential compound. They said they had been busy earning 
money from their land before they moved. “Who would have that free time and free 
mood to do that while farming? Everybody was busy with their vegetables or flowers,” 
an “elder sister” told me. Furthermore, only female villagers aging from thirty to sixty 
practice the square dance. This age range is much younger than their general urban 
counterpart, which means dancers in the village still work in the daytime. However, as 
the compensation money leaves the villagers without any notable career pressure or 
any pressing economic concerns, they can still enjoin dancing in the evening and 
expect to keep fit just like fashionable urban women. Contrary to the general square-
dancing trend in the community, local female villagers over sixty are more 
“conservative” and refuse to join this public showing-off. They are actually easy to 
recognize in the compound, wearing an iconic costume with blue Chinese-style jacket 
with buttons down the front and with embroidered apron. Matched with this costume, 
they wear a fillet dotted by tiny jade on their heads, with their hair worn in a bun 
behind. This is the typical rural dress for elderly rural women in Chenggong. Only 
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those over sixty still wear it. The younger generations do not follow this custom 
anymore. While the dancers are practicing, women wearing this traditional costume 
may sit beside watching, but never joining in. Compared with their fixed and iconic 
costume, dresses on women in the dance team are more colorful and fashionable. 
Boots and high-heeled shoes match all kinds of short skirts and jackets. Although the 
whole dance team tends to be younger than their urban counterpart, youngsters under 
thirty in the village do not join the dance. According to them, this is an “activity for 
old women”. 
With more free time after resettlement, women from each village 
spontaneously organized their own square dance team on different empty grounds in 
the compound. On fine evenings, after dinner, square dance enthusiasts would get 
together in their little square and dance with the music. Among the three villages, the 
dance team of Middle village is the most eye-catching one, since their “little square” 
is just located near the “little street” of the whole neighborhood. It is the empty 
ground in front of the supermarket at the main intersection. While they dance, other 
villagers, female and male may gather watching and chatting. Around the same square 
there is some outdoor fitness equipment fixed on the ground that people can use while 
chatting. Children may also try to follow some steps or just chase around. 
Participation of the dance team is free of charge and it is open to everyone, including 
the outsiders. Mostly the outsiders are those who run a business in the residential 
compound. Square dancing, then, is an activity that any community member can join 
and it has nothing to do with their hukou. As an outsider, I also took advantage of it to 
get to know people and let them get to know me.  
There is no hierarchy within this spontaneous organization. Anybody can lead 
a dance standing at the front row and others will follow. The steps are leant in various 
ways. Some are taught by the dance teachers of the Seniors’ College in Chenggong. 
They send teachers to various communities to teach dancing on weekends. Some are 
taught by two local primary school teachers. As primary school teachers, they get 
chances to learn new steps from their work place and then teach others here. These 
two sources also give villagers the impression that all teachers can dance and teach 
dance. So when I told them that I taught in college, they were very excited and 
immediately asked me to teach them some new dance. I had to explain that I came 
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here to follow and learn, and I could not teach. I felt sorry to let them down, but later, 
I found I could be of some other help. I could help them copy dance music to their 
USBs, since most of them did not have a computer at home. Besides these two ways, 
some enthusiasts also learn steps from videos by themselves and then teach others.  
Time is also a very loosely defined element. No fixed time for dancing is 
determined. When several members arrive after dinner, they will go to the community 
guardroom nearby, drag out the sound equipment stored there and connect to power. 
The equipment was bought using the village collective fund. The songs are stored on 
their USBs. Many of them buy a USB and keep the songs on it so that they 
themselves can practice at home as well. The songs are mainly folk songs with 
cheerful and fast tempo melody, such as pop songs of a Tibetan or inner Mongolian 
genre. I was so surprised that they could dance to hundreds of songs and remember 
some very complicated steps that really beat me. Once the music is on, more people 
will get together.  
Nobody will be judged for making wrong steps, since it is regarded as an 
entertainment and casual body exercise. In spite of proficiency, the same dance can be 
performed in various genres by different dancers, learned through their self-study. The 
dance usually lasts for one hour and half with approximately 30 dancers gathered each 
night. Some may dance while chatting with each other. The music is loud just as the 
square dance in all other places. The loud and cheerful music together with people 
dancing, strolling around and chatting, makes the intersection a place with renqi. I 
often joined the dance and met people there at the time of dancing. One day, I met a 
teacher who works in a university in the college town and lives in a residential 
compound developed exclusively for teachers from that university near here. He said 
he often went to swim in a nearby reservoir after work, and on his way home, he 
would always like to detour to drop by this little square in the evening and stay for a 
while. “I feel very pleasant and peaceful while staying in this village neighborhood 
chatting with people. Our residential area may have better facilities, but has few 
people,” he said: “Even there are more people in my residential compound in 
downtown Kunming, people are all strangers and seldom talk to one another. I 
appreciate the warmth of this community”. 
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In addition to providing a daily gathering for villagers, the square dance team 
may also practice very hard to join the regional square dance competitions in the 
name of their village. In sum, although spontaneously and loosely organized, the 
village square dance team contributes to the strengthening of a sense of both 
community and village collective. It is also a way of allowing female villagers to 
perform in public with confidence, coordination and beauty. 
Concluding remarks 
With the intervention of the local relocation policy, the “one-step urbanization” 
benefits the revival of collective identity for the three relocated villages in several 
ways. One important factor is that the local compensation package and the 
accumulation of the collective fund, first from the reserved cash compensation and 
later from the rental and operational income of the collective assets, help change the 
status of the village head / community director to work for collective aims. The 
election of the village cadres is based on the establishment of a patron-client nexus. 
Not designated as a government official, the director depends on his economic capital, 
social capital and symbolic capital to win the election and perform the expected 
management in the village. This new village organization and management give more 
authority and autonomy to the village collective, which benefits the reterritorialization 
of the village. As a self-governing organization, the village committee has the power 
to determine the allocation and investment direction of the collective fund. In this 
sense, each urban village works as a preliminary share-holding company after 
relocation. The relocated villages are required to invest in the share-holding company 
organized by the higher juridical-political unit. Thus, we see the state’s power still has 
strong control and penetration into villagers’ life. The village collective fund is also 
expected to invest in the business project in the new district, which is also based on 
the local state’s discourse of “let the locals benefit from the construction outcome of 
the new district”. This is further stressed when we see that the word renqi used quite 
often in villagers’ daily life, reflecting how they expect the ongoing urbanization to 
bring about an increase in their property value and profit to their collective investment 
project. In this sense, the local relocated peasants are not excluded from the 
commercialized city. On the contrary, they are included as investors contributing to 
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the local commercially booming economy. The state’s inclusion policy thus builds up 
a symbiotic relationship between the land-lost peasants and the local urbanization. 
We see then that the village collective identity brought about in several ways. 
It is institutionalized by rules concerning the distribution of dividend, the claim on the 
collective assets, the concern of the community welfare and the control of hukou; It is 
practiced through local custom and social network; It is presented in some important 
arenas, such as the office building of the Residents’ Committee of the community, the 
village bulletin board, the village guest hall, the village temple, the ground for the 
village square dance and by village base events, such as banquets, annual temple 
events and square dance.  
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CHAPTER 3  Employment in the city: exploiting 
the urban labor market 
When doing interviews in the college town and asking people “What do you do for a 
living”, the answer was always expressed as “I do dagong.” Dagong refers to work as 
a wage labor without high academic requirement and is quite the opposite of being a 
boss or an entrepreneur. Having something to do with migrant workers in the urban 
context, the term dagong sometimes conveys derogatory meaning.  
After relocation, the large majority of land-lost peasants chose to develop a 
new livelihood based on the locally urbanized labor market. A few with sufficient 
economic and social capital accumulated became local entrepreneurs running their 
own businesses. Different from other development projects (such as dams or the 
renovation of “urban villages”) that uprooted peasants and settled them far away from 
their former villages, in totally strange environments where there were few proper 
reemployment opportunities (see, for example, Liu and Murphy 2006:637; Wilmsen 
2011; Mcdonald et al. 2008), the college town happens to provide some opportunities 
that suit the land-lost peasants and therefore facilitate both their reemployment and 
process of reterritorialization. Without substantial physical removal, relocated 
villagers are still connected with their “historically formed sense of place and place-
based collective memory” (Hsing 2010:197). For instance, villagers tended to be very 
clear about which college “occupied” their former land. Once, I talked with some 
villagers whose land happened to be occupied by the university where I work. When I 
mentioned that I worked in the Minzu University, one of them asked without thinking: 
“The Minzu University of our village?” Without expecting he would respond like this, 
I laughed and then agreed with him: “Yes, the Minzu University of your village”.  
Thus, unlike the average migrant workers who leave their hometown and do 
dagong in big cities far away, most land-lost peasants in Chenggong do dagong 
locally. The college town provides a lot of job opportunities suited their conditions 
and preferences. These job opportunities are mainly on the service sector such as 
cleaners and gardeners on campus, in newly developed residential compounds, and 
even in the new municipal government complex; waiters and waitresses in canteens. 
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For the younger generations with higher education, they may find better jobs as office 
clerks in companies and thus earn more money. With better chances to live in cities, 
the younger generations definitely embrace the urban jobs more. Besides these wage 
labor jobs, villagers also seek to mobilize their own resources to earn money in the 
college town. For example, some with cars and driving license work as taxi drivers.  
The economic situation of dagong in Chenggong has been changing with local 
dynamics. In the early years of the college town construction, these jobs were easily 
found but often with low payment and strict conditions such as age limitation. Some 
employers were even picky about the looks of candidates, since they understood there 
were many land-lost peasants in the college town as a labor resource. The monthly 
wage was only 680 yuan in 2007. Later, new dynamics emerged and produced a labor 
shortage. On the one hand, with more campuses constructed, more maintainers were 
needed. On the other, when more villagers chose to continue as peasants and migrated 
to neighboring counties, the labor shortage was aggravated. Such changes in supply 
and demand affected the local wage labor market. The wage doubled, even tripled. 
Ads are often seen on village bulletin boards with wages ranging from 1,200 yuan to 
2,000 yuan per month. The rise of wages in the whole region can be seen from the 
officially published minimum wage standard. In May 2013, according to the 
regulation of Yunnan provincial government, the minimum salary level in Chenggong 
district was 1,130 yuan per month.  
Being without special skills or high education, this labor market become a 
preferred choice for villagers. They seem happy since the jobs are quite near home 
and are relatively “free”. When interviewed, they always say: “The work is not tiring, 
but it won’t let you earn much.” While enjoying the privilege of having the freedom 
and flexibility of employment near home, the wage level on the other hand does not 
help much on their savings. On the contrary, as wages are limited, the compensation 
money is consumed from time to time to cover family expenses. 
Campus work 
There are two typical campus jobs in the college town: cleaners and gardeners. They 
seem gendered in a sense. Almost all the cleaners are female and most gardeners are 
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male. This is partly caused by the ads for the jobs and partly by the people’s 
stereotypes. Some ads clearly say that female workers are wanted. Others do not say 
that, but since colleagues are all female (or male), villagers feel embarrassed to work 
among people of the opposite sex. They feel more at east working among people with 
the same gender.  
I met Fang from the square dance team of Middle village. She is in her thirties 
and is a mother of two children. She has been working in a nearby university for 
several years. Her husband also works in the same university as an electrician. The 
couple’s income is about 4,000 yuan per month, which means that their annual 
income is as much as that of a very hard working rural household in the village before 
the land appropriation. Nevertheless, in the urban context, Fang said they had to use 
some compensation money to make ends meet from time to time, for example, when 
her children got sick. “Do you think money will be a problem in the future?” “It is OK. 
If you have more money, you spend more; if you don’t, you spend less. That’s it.” 
“Do you miss the farming life before?” I asked. “Are you kidding? You don’t know 
how tiring it is to farm. I enjoy my current life.” Her answer made me feel that I just 
asked a very silly question. Later, Fang took me to “experience” her work and I found 
that she was indeed very happy working with her female friends, enjoying being with 
them.  
During the work, Fang develops a good relationship with four other local 
female villagers and they back up one another when in need. For example, when 
Fang’s son was sick and she needed to take him to the county hospital, her “good 
sisters” would share her work; if she was asked to offer help in the village guest hall, 
she could also be able to well coordinate her job and her social obligation with the 
help of her “good sisters”. At work the understanding is that they are not absent in the 
manager’s record as long as the work is finished. In fact, the manager does not 
directly supervise each of them. Team leaders arrange their work. The team leaders 
are selected from cleaners with ability to mediate conflicts and arrange the work. 
Therefore, they enjoy some freedom under the level of the manager. Cleaners go to 
work at 7 o’clock in the morning, punch the card in the manager’s office and then 
begin sweeping their own plot. Cleaners are supposed to sweep the campus twice a 
day, but as long as they can keep it clean all day long, nobody will investigate 
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whether the second time is performed or not. Fang and her friends are very serious 
about the cleanliness of their own territory. When walking on the campus, they always 
pick up garbage on the ground as soon as they see it. Fang often jokes about this 
reflex: “We are hopeless. Normal people stare at the ground looking for money, while 
we are only sensitive to garbage.” The working hour is from 7am to 5pm. Workers go 
to the manager’s office to punch the card at 5 pm and go home. As long as the campus 
is clean and they show up in the manager’s office on time twice a day, they are full-
time employees. Fang and her friends often finish the first cleaning by noon, go back 
home to cook and have lunch. The afternoon is less tense. Besides walking around 
now and then on campus picking garbage on the ground, they can enjoy some free 
time chatting and having fun. They often stay in their rest room, teach each other how 
to knit sweaters or sometimes go shopping together in the nearby commercial streets.  
Although the income is not much, Fang is not ambitious to earn more money 
as migrant workers might do in cities. Migrant workers have the heavy burden of 
paying the rent in cities and save money to support poor families in their home 
villages. Fang enjoys her job as well as her life in the residential compound. She is 
one of the enthusiasts in the village square dance team. When the evening comes, she 
often stands on the first row leading the dance with confidence and dedication. Fang 
only got primary school education and I was curious about whether she would like her 
children to “fulfill an academic dream” for her, as many urban parents who 
themselves missed their chance of study would do. “I will try my best to give them 
my support as long as they want to go to school, but I will never push them hard to 
study,” she said. 
While female villagers like Fang enjoy the campus work, earning their own 
wages and having fun working together with friends, some male villagers have similar 
conditions in this campus work. Similar to the cleaning job for women, the gardening 
job is easy and flexible for male villagers as well. They have the liberty to have breaks 
and enjoy a cigarette together during work. However, these service jobs are 
considered as “low grade” and physical labor is looked down on by people in the city 
(Zhang 2002:323). Surrounded by the glory of successful peasants and being the 
patriarchs of the family some male villagers in their fifties would stay home rather 
than take jobs as gardeners. While wives in their fifties do not mind finding a cleaning 
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job outside, husbands without other appealing job options end up staying at home 
where they help take care of grandchildren. Villagers say: “Now we have a bunch of 
male nannies in the village”.  
Drivers 
There are villagers working as all kinds of drivers. Some are recruited by the bus 
companies and work in the public transportation system as formal staff. Others work 
as freelancers, for example, some who bought the sprinkling trucks can be hired by 
gardening companies for part-time or full-time jobs. However, more freelancers use 
their minibuses, cars, or motorcycles for transportation business. They are called 
“black cars” [heiche], which implies that they are not legal taxies. Both the drivers 
and their vehicles may not meet the requirement for transportation business and they 
are not included in the national tax system. Such activities are strictly prohibited in 
downtown Kunming, but are more accepted in Chenggong. The local authority seems 
to turn a blind eye to it. As I see it, there are two possible reasons: first, the flexibility 
of “black cars” helps reduce the inconvenience of public transportation in Chenggong; 
second, it is an accepted extra income source for local land-lost peasants. In fact, 
anyone who has a vehicle can join this business in the college town. Drivers are not 
necessarily full-time. For instance, a villager in his forties working in an institute in 
the college town as a security guard drives his motorcycle to do transportation 
business when he comes off the shift. In another case, a local villager in his thirties, 
who works as a purchaser in a restaurant in the “land-lost peasants entrepreneurial 
base” sometimes drives his minibus out in the evening as a taxi.  
There are also some relatively full-time “black car” drivers from local villages 
who make a living out of it, relying totally on their driving license and private car. 
Their income may fluctuate every month, but they can obtain an average income 
similar to villagers who do dagong on campus, while they enjoy more freedom and 
“dignity” as freelancers. It was difficult to get direct information from these drivers 
due to their somewhat illegal work. They face the risk of being fined by the 
authorities. “The situation is much better now. They may fine you some money when 
you are reported, but they do not confiscate your car. So it is risky to do the business, 
but the risk is not vital,” a villager told me. Private cars and minibuses are always 
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found parking in front of the gates of colleges, with their drivers going to potential 
passengers asking their destinations and negotiating the prices.  
Enjoy retirement  
Urbanization produces “retired villagers” in the resettlement residential areas, which 
also is a new thing. In the Chinese rural context, villagers do not have the concept of 
retirement and peasants in their sixties and seventies still work on their contracted 
land as long as they are physically able to (see Pang et al. 2004:73). Work is equated 
with necessities such as food, clothing and shelter. Any penny comes from farming. 
Their urban counterparts are treated differently. They stop working after their 
retirement age and get pension every month. In the eyes of the rural villagers, 
urbanites are “raised” by the state after they get old. Relocation policy in Chenggong 
provides some subsidies stimulating the purchase of pension insurance. Most senior 
villagers I interviewed have bought such pension insurance. Now they can get several 
hundred yuan every month and enjoy the urban life. They regard this as an 
improvement. “Now we don’t have to rely on sons or grandsons anymore,” one of 
them told me. With pension as monthly income, they feel at ease to do nothing, 
enjoying their retirement time. They often gather on the public greening chatting and 
playing cards, or take a walk on the campuses.  
In the past, with little income, thrifty senior peasants used to walk around in 
the fields or in the mountains to see if they could bring back some wild vegetables for 
their family to eat. In contrast, elderly urbanites in Kunming like taking a walk in 
public parks as a body exercise. Now the two activities are combined by elder 
villagers in the college town. Some of them take a walk on campus as a body exercise 
like the elderly in cities while picking up discarded plastic drink bottles and carton 
boards that they can sell for money. Some senior villagers also learn to take advantage 
of the favorable treatment provided by the public transportation. In the name of 
respecting senior citizens, the city bus company issues “loving heart bus card” 
[aixinka] for those over 60 in Kunming. Now that Chenggong is part of Kunming, this 
favorable policy includes Chenggong as well. Senior villagers over 60 can travel by 
bus for free, so they often make a visit to the old town center, the new public parks 
and the municipal government complex for a walk and sightseeing. Besides buses, 
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they have the priority to take the newly built light rail that connects the new district of 
Chenggong to downtown Kunming. Having been looked down upon by their urban 
neighbors in Kunming for “backwardness”, now they have the chance to enjoy the 
modern transportation system even earlier than most of urbanites in Kunming.  
Businessmen in Chenggong 
The local entrepreneurs whom I interviewed would complain that it is hard to run a 
business in the college town. People often blame this on the lack of renqi. The 
investment in a small business is about 200,000 yuan, which many land-lost 
households may afford with the input of their cash compensation. Rather, villagers 
would like to try investing in small businesses that they are familiar with, such as fruit 
stalls.  
Kun is a villager of North village. He, his wife and their daughter have two 
apartments in relocation. They live in one of them and rent the other out. As young as 
thirteen, Kun already followed his elder brother to sell fruits in Kunming. Each time, 
they rode bicycles for one hour and a half from the village to the market in Kunming. 
In the 1990s, he was in his twenties and followed other villagers to work as a peasant 
worker digging fire clay. They were asked to work for twelve hours a day. While the 
boss earned good money, their daily wage was just five yuan. Since then, he made the 
decision that he would only work for himself. “No matter how much or how little, all 
the money will be yours.” Later, he concentrated on vegetable farming. Apart from 
the six mu contracted land of his family, he rented more land in a neighboring village. 
He could save 10,000 yuan each year. That was right before the land expropriation. 
After the resettlement, he rented a stall from the village committee in the commercial 
street on the north periphery of the residential compound and began selling fruits with 
his wife. His stall was placed together with many smoky barbecue stalls, which was 
not agreeable for his wife, so they subcontracted the stall and stayed at home for some 
time. Feeling that it was really boring to be unemployed, he accepted a job to work as 
a security guard in the nearest college. “The salary was 2,400 yuan per month. It was 
not tiring although sometimes we had to work night shifts.” Not long after, his father 
passed away and he had to ask for leave for the funeral. The manager who is not local 
seemed unhappy about it, so Kun just quit the job after the funeral. “The job is not 
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free and if you ask for a leave when you have other things to do, they will be unhappy. 
So I just quit and sell fruits again.” Now he is the only local person doing fruit 
business on the commercial street, others are all outsiders. “There were several fellow 
villagers selling fruits before but they could not earn money, so they gave up,” he 
explained.  
Most of Kun’s customers are college students. Many of them look familiar to 
him. While sitting with Kun at his stall, I saw students pass and greet him. As 
customers, they also trust him. Many pick fruits, deliver them to Kun to weigh and 
pay him without asking the unit price. Kun’s relaxed attitude and his habit of reducing 
the price often make his customers happy. However, he also has his principle. Once, 
two girls carrying a bag of fruits that they just bought from the next fruit stall wanted 
to verify the weight of their purchase on Kun’s scale. Kun immediately stopped them. 
“That will make trouble,” he said.  
One day, at about 5 pm, I saw a large group of students pass through the 
commercial street and swarm into the resettlement residential compound. They would 
have their dinner in restaurants run in the transformed tool rooms of the yellow 
buildings. When I was surprised at the renqi of the commercial street, Kun told me it 
was not as popular as three or four years ago. “The commercial street was much more 
crowded three years ago. At that time, the street was so crowded, especially in the 
evening that a two-minute walk strolling from end to end usually needed ten minutes 
in the evening. The renqi was shared and scattered to the commercial street outside 
the teachers’ residential compound.” I understand that the compound that he refers to 
is the one where my apartment is located. The street along the east side of the gated 
compound has become the most crowded commercial area in the college town in the 
recent two years. 
Although successful, Kun’s business may be too small to place him among 
business elites. Jiaming should be such a business elite. Jiaming is in his early forties 
and runs a restaurant in the “land-lost peasants entrepreneurial base”. His restaurant 
has three floors and is exquisitely decorated. Jiaming is from one of the dislocated 
villages in Chenggong but strictly he is not a land-lost peasant. After graduation from 
a university in Kunming, Jiaming ran his own business in Kunming. Several years ago, 
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one of his former classmates who worked in the county government of Chenggong 
told him about the preferential policy for land-lost peasants to start their business in 
the “entrepreneurial base”. He invested this restaurant there. He told me that he had 
invested 3,000,000 yuan in this restaurant so far. The business is not very good. In 
fact, due to the lack of customers, the business in the whole “entrepreneurial base” is 
slack. His restaurant is one of the better ones. Most of his employees, mainly waiters 
and waitresses are young boys and girls around twenty from Chenggong. The 
manager in her twenties graduated from a college in Kunming years ago. She 
complains that it is hard to control her young employees. “They are not with high 
suzhi. Although you teach them for many times about how to do things right, they will 
never listen. You can’t scold them, either. If you push them too hard, they will just 
quit.” Two senior female employees in their forties and fifties respectively working as 
dishwashers and cleaners in the kitchen are from one of the dislocated villages. They 
said they felt lucky to find a job here. “The boss is a kind person. It is just that the 
business of the restaurant is not very good. You see, the whole commercial plaza has 
no renqi. We hope his business will be good so we may be able to ask him to raise our 
salary.” Located at the relatively marginal area and a little further from the campuses, 
the “entrepreneurial base” is not as bustling as expected. Jiaming and other 
businessmen often sponsor various activities or competitions in order to attract college 
students here and promote renqi in this place, but all these efforts have not received 
satisfying outcome.   
Concluding remarks 
In contrast to long-distance resettlement and other possible unfavorable trends such as 
joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, loss of access to common property, and 
social disintegration (Wilmsen 2011:147), the “inplace urbanization” [jiudi 
chengshihua] in Chenggong and the particularity of the college town project facilitate 
the market economy to absorb displacees from the agricultural sector in some sense. 
Therefore, the majority of villagers would rather stay to exploit the local markets than 
become migrant workers. This is in favor of their reterritorialization in the college 
town and meanwhile the autonomy of village collectives within the resettlement 
residential compound, which I have discussed in Chapter 2. Moreover, the presence of 
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many fellow villagers in almost every corner of the college town as cleaners, 
gardeners, security guards, cooks, waiters and waitresses in colleges and other 
residential compounds reduce their feeling of alienation in urban settings. Although 
their original landscape is totally changed, Chenggong is still “their place” with their 
memory, their homes, their jobs and their main social networks.  
The adaptation to the new environment imposes challenges to people. Due to 
the limitation in livelihood options, female villagers tend to find jobs and accept them 
more easily in the college town, while male villagers have problem finding pleasant 
jobs without hurting their masculinity. Therefore, the urbanization process facilitates 
women’s movement out of the domestic sphere to a more public and independent 
situation, at least to some extent. Urbanization also includes the rural seniors into 
pension systems and other privileges, which give them chances to extend their space 
beyond their villages. Meanwhile, we notice that villagers’ employment situation in 
Chenggong is not static. It may fluctuate with other dynamics, such as supply and 
demand in the local labor market and with the renqi of the areas.  
Despite many different livelihood choices, there appears to be one salient 
distinction between my informants: Most villagers turn to wage laborers, while a few 
become entrepreneurs. This process of polarization in wealth probably also existed 
among villagers before, but is accelerated by urbanization and by the input of cash 
compensation. Besides a few entrepreneurs who run businesses in Chenggong, more 
entrepreneurs are found in another group which is worth discussing. They are migrant 
farming entrepreneurs, who will be the focus of Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4  Becoming farming entrepreneurs 
Some land-lost peasants chose to migrate to neighboring counties, renting land to 
continue their greenhouse farming as their livelihood after relocation. Although using 
the similar greenhouse farming technique and still growing greenhouse vegetables and 
fresh cut flowers for export like before, with the cash compensation as the start-up 
investment, the size of their farm is scaled up, to more than 20 mu or even bigger. To 
satisfy the need on a farm of such a size, it is impossible to rely on labor recruited 
within the family or mutual help from fellow villagers. Instead, farmers hire 
farmworkers with different skills to finish work on their farm. The entry of the 
investor-farmers with compensation cash capital into unofficial land lease market 
renders the local peasants to lease out their land and then to become farmworkers, 
thus stimulating the corresponding agricultural industrial chain to form in these 
counties. Based on the above characteristics, I name the investor-farmers from 
Chenggong “farming entrepreneurs”.  
Statics show that there are 12,173 land-lost peasants in Chenggong going out 
renting land of 99,496 mu in 2011. They do not account for the majority of land-lost 
peasants in Chenggong, but they do show up on local news and in official propaganda, 
represented as a model of how the local state helps land-lost peasants to achieve 
reemployment successfully. Due to the scale effect, the income of these farming 
entrepreneur households is likely to be increased compared to before, thus they 
become the evidence that the urbanization also benefits land-lost peasants and make 
them “develop”. In this sense, the image of land-lost peasants is to some extent based 
on the successful farming entrepreneur group. The historically derogatory 
objectification of the peasantry as uncivilized [meiwenhua] and backward [luohou] 
temporarily gives way to “skilled migration” for the “regional economic development” 
and “folk angels” of the “integration of central Yunnan” – all concepts heard and seen 
in the local media reports in Kunming (Kunming Daily, April 8
th
 2011). 
Addressed as “bosses” by their farmworkers and known as “being rich bosses” 
in other counties and talked about as entrepreneurs in their own village back in 
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Chenggong, the farming entrepreneurs find the respect and confidence that rural 
peasants have been lacking in China.  
However, my fieldwork suggests that such a successful livelihood is not plain 
sailing all along for villagers in Chenggong. Disregarding romantic nostalgia about 
farming culture, there are economic dilemmas behind this choice. Let us look at some 
of the challenges. 
The earliest entrepreneurs 
Having similar climate to Kunming, the nationally famous “city of eternal spring”, 
Chenggong has a proper climate and soil qualities for the growth of vegetables, 
flowers and its famous big, juicy and sweet pears. Most Chenggong villagers had the 
experience of selling their pears in Kunming by walking or by bicycle as early as 
1980s. Although suffering from the poor transportation system, diligent villagers 
could still make a fortune at the harvest time by exploiting the accessible market. By 
the end of the twentieth century, with interregional markets across the country and the 
formation of the agricultural industrial chain, some villagers accumulated a substantial 
amount of capital through farming. Right before the construction project of the “New 
Kunming”, their vegetables, fruits and flowers had been mainly sold out of Yunnan to 
the east coast of China and even further to the overseas market. Farming was their 
main livelihood and something that they were really good at.  
The villages in the area of the college town were not the richest in Chenggong, 
but some village households could still earn up to 30,000 to 40,000 yuan a year 
through family members’ own hard work. When it came to the moment of relocation, 
with their own savings and the received cash compensation, many villagers chose to 
lead an easy life and gave themselves a good “break”. Money was spent open-handed 
on various items such as decoration of their new apartments, good clothes, luxury 
mobile phones, jewelries and cars. Consumption quickly became a competition 
among villagers. Some took the chance to start traveling to see the outside world for 
the first time in their lives. They joined tourist groups to go sightseeing in big 
metropolises in China like Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. More villagers were keen 
on local entertainment, such as having banquets in restaurants with friends, drinking 
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and singing in KTVs, or gambling. The excitement of enjoying an urban and 
extravagant life was gradually cooled down and people subordinated themselves to 
the reality that urban cost of living was much higher than their rural one. “The 
expenditure begins as soon as you open your eyes in the morning,” a villager said. 
Villagers realized that the cash compensation would be used up soon if they kept the 
current consumption level without supplement. Being idle for some time, they began 
thinking about working. Farming was definitely on their mind, being the only thing 
they were confident with. To continue farming meant a lot of start-up capital, an 
amount equal to all their savings. Besides, there was no land available in Chenggong, 
which meant they had to migrate to other counties to rent land. Risk of investment and 
the foreseeable hardships made villagers hesitate. The discourse in villages did not 
encourage taking this risk. Fellow villagers would sneer those who had the idea to 
continue farming outside: “We have been farmers all our lives. Aren’t you fed up with 
it?” So most of them just followed others to find a job in the college town, but a few 
with initiative still chose to take the risk. They became the earliest entrepreneurs.  
Following my informants in the resettlement residential compound in 
Chenggong, I extended my fieldwork to Songming. Songming is about 76 km away 
from Chenggong, approximately one hour’s drive by car. It is one of the counties with 
abundant land available, which made the land renting possible for Chenggong land-
lost peasants. With Chenggong land-lost peasants renting land and doing greenhouse 
farming, the latest five or six years see a complete and new agricultural industrial 
chain being formed in Songming. The industrial chain includes skilled farmworkers, 
truck drivers, cold storage [lengku] owners, greenhouse builders, seedling cultivators, 
farm manure providers, pesticide providers and chemical fertilizer providers, which 
all facilitate greenhouse farming and induce more greenhouse investors to make a 
fortune.  
The current facilities are based on the striving of these earliest farming 
entrepreneurs. In the first few years, they taught and trained the local peasants step by 
step about how to cultivate the greenhouse vegetables. They themselves worked as 
truck drivers transporting their farmworkers, fertilizers and pesticides from 
Chenggong to Songming. They also had to transport their harvest back to Chenggong 
to sell, since cold storages were all placed in Chenggong. The hardships that the 
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entrepreneurs had experienced scared off others who had the intention but were less 
determined. This hesitation and the following dynamics set a higher threshold for 
others to join. Also “my” land-lost peasants had to rely on the social network back in 
the home village to deal with difficulties they encounter. One such challenge is to find 
good plots of land. 
To find a good piece of land 
A good piece of land with proper price is hard to find. Most villagers depend on their 
trustworthy kinsmen and close fellow villagers to help them rent the land. Renting 
land can be a very complicated problem that requires all the possible resources a 
person has. First and foremost is the actor’s social capital. A villager with more social 
capital tends to find a good piece of land with proper price. High volume of social 
capital comes firstly from a social network as wide as possible. Therefore, when a 
person claims that he would like to rent a piece of land, his widely scattered relatives 
and friends can give him feedback with useful information not exclusively from one 
county. The efficacy of the information brought back not only depends on the size of 
the network of connections he can effectively mobilize, but also on the “volume of the 
capital (economic, cultural and symbolic)” (Bourdieu 1986:249).  
Here, I confine Bourdieu’s cultural capital in a narrow sense by referring it to 
the expertise that is necessary for practice farming. In this sense, cultural capital only 
exists in the form of local knowledge and skills of how to cultivate and manage the 
greenhouse farm in order to be a successful farmer. In other words, the cultural capital 
in this sense can almost directly convert to economic capital in the field of 
agribusiness. Following Bourdieu, we can say that the cultural capital in agriculture 
that the farming entrepreneurs acquire comes from “long-lasting dispositions of the 
mind and body” (Bourdieu 1986:243) in the rural society. It is not leant from schools 
and perhaps not identified as education by the people themselves, as its holders are 
regarded by many as illiterate or uncivilized. First at this is a “good eye” in 
distinguishing good land from bad land.  
To look for a plot for others can be time consuming and sometimes 
troublesome, but since guanxi and mutual help work both ways all members in the 
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same social network have the obligation to provide backing when one member is in 
need. My fieldwork indicates that with limited extension of their social network in 
Songming, the farming entrepreneurs have been valuing their established social 
network back home and this might explain how they always manage to attend village-
based activities in the resettlement residential compound, no matter how busy they are. 
Shaohua’s father Jiaxiang is one of the migrant farmers in Songming. He 
comes from Middle village. Jiaxiang in his forties is a stern man. He is not tall but 
strong and tanned. His image just fits my imagination for a typical Chinese 
ploughman. Before I could finally meet him on his land in Songming, his son 
comforted me about the meeting: “Don’t be afraid if he looks serious. He is always 
like that. It doesn’t mean he is angry with you.” The meeting went much better than I 
had expected. Jiaxiang was easy-going and became talkative when asked about 
farming. Jiaxiang and his wife started renting land three years ago through the help of 
one of his nephews who is one of the earliest entrepreneurs in Middle village. Jiaxiang 
rents 20 mu farmland in Songming. He told me that to have at least 40 mu to farm 
could bring the best profit rate. I asked him why he did not rent as much as that and he 
explained: 
Our appropriation money was given bit by bit. For example, as early as 
2003, the government appropriated some of our land for the construction of a 
new road. This brought each villager in our village something like 20,000 yuan 
as cash compensation. The continuous appropriation did not stop until all our 
land was appropriated and we were relocated. Although each villager got 
approximately 200,000 yuan in total, the cash compensation was spent here and 
there as soon as it was allocated. Very few of us would think of saving it as 
capital for investment. In the early years, renting land doing cultivation outside 
did not make a fortune like these years. Most villagers like us didn’t realize it 
was the right thing to do. When we planned to do it three years ago, the money 
was spent on other items and the land rent was much higher. That’s why we 
could only afford renting 20 mu. It would be perfect if we could have 20 more. 
Now, to find a piece of good land is harder and harder. 
This dilemma also keeps many villagers from choosing migrant farming as 
their livelihoods. Jiaxiang gave me a detailed investment estimation of renting and 
farming a piece of land of 40 mu. From looking for a piece of land to the first harvest, 
a household needs to prepare at least 600,000 yuan for the initial investment. Some of 
the villagers had to borrow money from their relatives. “You can’t imagine how 
stressful it would be when witnessing the whole family savings and loan ‘disappear’ 
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on an empty greenhouse farm. I was often sleepless in the evening,” Jiaxiang recalled 
the first months of his entrepreneuring: “For the same size of land, the investment can 
be more than that. It depends.” I understand his meaning quite well after I experienced 
several times of looking for a good piece of land with him, seeing all the fluctuations 
of different evaluations and choices. 
The day when I met Jiaxiang and his wife on their farm was a busy day for 
him. Several other men were visiting him discussing a piece of land that they wanted 
to rent for a young man. The young man in his late twenties was Jiaxiang’s nephew 
Chao, who allegedly had been “idling” for years and wanted to do some “real business” 
now. Other two men were Jiaxiang’s nephew Lintao and Lintao’s best fellow villager 
friend. Both of them in their thirties were among the earliest successful farming 
entrepreneurs. It was Lintao who introduced Jiaxiang into this business three years 
ago. They were all villagers of Middle village. When Chao declared that he wanted to 
rent some land to do greenhouse farming just like them, they began keeping an eye on 
the local information in Songming for him. Recently, they found a young Cantonese 
man who failed at making money from farming and wanted to transfer his land lease. 
They evaluated the quality of the land and concluded that it was a very good plot with 
abundant water resource and at the same time good location to avoid the flooding in 
the rainy season. The young Cantonese was from an affluent family. His two uncles 
had been doing business in Chenggong for years. Like many other outsiders coming 
from east part of Yunnan and even outside the province, the young Cantonese was 
enchanted by the great success achieved by Chenggong peasants, so he came to rent a 
piece of land to do greenhouse farming himself. With very little farming experience 
and careless management, his vegetables did not grow well and he lost a lot of money. 
Now he wanted to transfer the whole farm to someone to pay his debt. He urged Chao 
to sign the contract as soon as possible. Jiaxiang suggested that they should meet and 
talk to the local village committee to see how they felt about the transfer. They asked 
for a meeting with the Cantonese and the village head in the afternoon and organized 
a banquet after that, as was the tradition. Jiaxiang told Chao to prepare enough money 
for the night. This would be an important occasion for Chao to build up guanxi with 
the cadres of the local village. I asked Jiaxiang whether I could go with them. He 
looked embarrassed. I understood immediately this would be a serious negotiation and 
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only insiders and men were the proper attendees. He promised he would let me know 
the detail when he came home.  
In the late evening that day, the others drove Jiaxiang back home. He said the 
meeting and the banquet went very well. The village representatives drank with them 
and promised to give Chao “convenience” in the future. In the end, they paid 10,000 
yuan to the young Cantonese as earnest money and they talked about measuring the 
land and deciding the final price the next day. The unit price for the land with 
greenhouse and everything on it was 16,000 yuan each mu but the Young Cantonese 
claimed that his land was 33 mu in total although his contract signed with the village 
said it was only 27 mu. He explained that since he had a good guanxi with the village 
head, the village head secretly exempted six mu on the contract. Now, he asked for 
rent according to the actual area in order to offset some of his loss.  
The next afternoon, the men brought the measuring tape and went to measure 
the land. We three women, Jiaxiang’s wife, her daughter and me were allowed to 
follow this time. There were not enough seats in the car, so we three women walked 
there through field ridges. It was only 15 minutes’ walk. The Young Cantonese’s farm 
looked bleak. The films of the greenhouses looked worn out with weeds and sundries 
all over outside. The vegetables in the greenhouse were in some unhealthy and 
yellowish color. It was quite the opposite view than what could be seen on Jiaxiang’s 
thriving greenhouse farm. Jiaxiang and the others were busy measuring the land. They 
wrote down every figure they could measure and then used the limited math 
knowledge mainly learnt in elementary school to estimate the area. However, no 
matter how they measured and calculated, the area was 27 mu instead of 33 mu. While 
they measured the land under the stinging sunshine, the young Cantonese sat inside 
playing games on his laptop. When he got to know their result, he could not believe it. 
He seemed to trust Jiaxiang and his nephews not to make a mistake nor deliberately 
deceive him, but it was harder for him to believe that the village head deceived him 
after he gave him 30,000 yuan as secret brokerage and constant gifts and banquets at 
times. He called the village head to verify the figure. It turned out that the village head 
did not betray the collective benefit by receiving the bribery but fooled the young 
Cantonese by saying that the land was 33 mu. His dream to offset his loss by charging 
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on the extra land area was disillusioned and he became hesitant to subcontract the 
farm for the unit price of 16,000 yuan to Jiaxiang’s nephew. 
On the morning of the third day, Jiaxiang and the others went to bargain with 
the young Cantonese and tried to persuade him to rent for 432,000 yuan based on 27 
mu in total or with 10,000 yuan more. We women stayed home cooking for them. 
After noon Jiaxiang came home with one of his eyes bruised. He told us that they 
encountered some creditors with a lot of helpers coming to ask for payment from the 
young Cantonese. The creditors were the greenhouse constructors, the fertilizer 
providers and some farmworkers. The young Cantonese owed them the payments for 
the goods and salaries. The creditors heard that there was a contract transfer in 
progress and they worried that the young Cantonese would run away with money, so 
they came to watch and urge him to pay debts as soon as possible. The confrontation 
developed to a riot and Jiaxiang was accidentally injured. Considering the complex 
situation, Jiaxiang and the others finally decided to give up this land and looked for 
another plot for Chao.  
The great demand for land renting also brings consequences for the village 
cadres in Songming, consequences which to some extent are similar to the dynamics 
in the resettlement residential compound in Chenggong. Through organizing the land 
renting, the village committee interferes in villagers’ economic life once again. The 
political capital of village cadres is increased through their role as brokers between 
migrant farmers and local villages. Exploiting a flourishing unofficial land renting 
market, their political position can readily convert to economic capital.  
Like Chenggong in the past, Songming is an agricultural county. The county 
seat is surrounded by vast farmland. Villages are engaged in farming with 1.5 mu per 
capita as contracted land allocated after the household responsibility system was 
established in 1980s. The land was allocated equally to each household mixing with 
both good quality and bad quality. Thus, an area of 20 mu can be farmed by over 100 
households. It is nearly impossible for a migrant farmer to negotiate with as many 
landlords as that to rent the land. It is local village cadres who have the authority to 
summon that many villagers to give up their land at once. Migrant farmers not only 
depend on village cadres to obtain land, but also need to rely on them to obtain 
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facilities such as the introduction of electricity and tap water from the village to their 
farm and help solve unexpected conflicts in the future. Hence, they always intend to 
build good relationships with local village cadres through banquets and gifts. At the 
same time, they feel that individuals are not as reliable as a concrete organization such 
as a village committee, so they prefer to sign the contract with the organization. 
Likewise, as for the local villagers, they can rely on their village cadres to rent their 
land out for rental income without having to deal with “untrustworthy” strangers.  
The greenhouse farming 
The whole production, management and sale of greenhouse farming depend on the 
farming entrepreneurs’ experience and skills. The greenhouse farming is not 
physically tiring for farmers. Daily work including watering and fertilizing is done by 
the sprinkling irrigation system mounted in greenhouses. However, farmers need to 
control the proper timing and the dosage. The pesticide and farm chemical spraying is 
a skilful job, not only the formula but also the process of spraying itself. It is requires 
some strength as well, for the person needs to drag a long rubber pipe with the sprayer 
at its end walking repeatedly along greenhouses. The job is done through the 
coordination of the farmer couple. When a husband sprays along the greenhouse, his 
wife stands on the track helping him adjust the rubber pipe. If the wife happens to 
leave for Chenggong, then the husband has to hire a worker to assist him. The hard 
labor in the busy season is accomplished by hired farmworkers. Farmers would hire 
daily farmworkers to finish other labor-intensive farming jobs like ploughing land, 
hoeing weed and harvesting. Thanks to the earliest entrepreneurs’ training and 
cultivation, there are many skillful farmworkers in Songming. 
It is quite necessary to hire farmworkers to finish the work, because time is a 
big issue for greenhouse farmers. With time saved, they will get a chance to grow one 
more harvest within a year. The usage of land here is just like the usage of a machine 
in a factory. A running machine can always bring profit to the owner. The growing 
period of greenhouse vegetable is 45 days on average, so the high utilization of the 
land can bring more harvest times to farmers within a year. The vegetables are to meet 
the market demand of the coastal cities in east China, such as Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen. There is a small local market in Kunming. The head lettuce [tuanshencai], 
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the leaf lettuce [youmaicai], the milk Chinese cabbage [naibaicai] are the popular 
types that farmers grow. Broccoli is popular, too, but its growth does not need 
greenhouse cultivation. The basic price for each type of vegetables on the purchasing 
day is determined by the market of its destination, for example, the market in 
Guangzhou. It can fluctuate dramatically. The unit price of per kilo can range from 
0.3 yuan to 7 yuan. Therefore, the gross income for a harvest of 20 mu can vary from 
9,000 yuan to 210,000 yuan. As suppliers, the farmer has a limited scope to negotiate 
the price with cold storage bosses. The quality of vegetables is another factor, but it is 
just simply categorized into two levels: the qualified level and unqualified level. 
Qualified vegetables are purchased by the cold-storage boss for the normal price, 
while the unqualified ones can only be purchased to the “bad noodle storage” 
[lanmianku] with the price even lower than cost. In some bad cases, the farmer has to 
spend money to hire labor to clean the vegetables from the land as garbage.  
The harvest of greenhouse vegetables should be as standard as products 
produced from an industrial assembly line to meet the requirement. Their cultivation 
needs experienced farmers and skillful farmworkers to control and adjust their growth. 
Besides personal accumulation, migrant farmers acquire the knowledge and 
experience mainly from their relatives and close friends. “Other people will not teach 
you if you are not a relative. After all, there is some competitive relationship among 
us.” The knowledge such as when and how to choose proper pesticide to prevent 
vegetables from the disease and insect pests, when to choose right farm chemicals to 
adjust the growth of vegetable to the ideal shape and how to spray the pesticide and 
farm chemicals should be grasped well by farmers themselves. Meanwhile, they 
should have the ability to distinguish the good farmworkers from the bad ones. When 
the harvest time is approaching, the farmer will contact a cold storage boss to place an 
order. In the time of a tight market, storage bosses will personally drive around 
looking for the supply of goods. After the purchasing date is set, according to the 
workload, the farmer will set about to call farmworkers and truck drivers to come on 
the purchasing day. Farmers have their own stable farmworkers and truck drivers 
based on long-term cooperation, but they can also find new ones from the labor 
market.  
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The mature industrial chain has produced a large group of skilled greenhouse 
farmworkers. Some of farmworkers come from poor rural area in Yunnan and 
adjacent provinces such as Sichuan and Guizhou, while most of them are local 
peasants in Songming, in my informants’ words: “Chenggong people taught 
Songming people how to farm.” With a lot of migrant farmers from Chenggong 
flocking into Songming to rent land, many local peasants choose to rent out their 
contracted farmland for the yearly rental income. Freed from the land, local peasants 
become “rural surplus labor” either standing at the local labor market looking for 
employment or work on the greenhouse farm run by Chenggong villagers. Most 
farmworkers working in the greenhouse are middle-aged women. Some persons with 
mobile phones are the main contacts of greenhouse farmers. The greenhouse farmer 
will call the contact and talk about the working dates, the types of work, the wage and 
the number of workers he needs. The contact is in charge of finding needed number of 
farmworkers in her village and they all come to work on an appointed date. Each 
greenhouse farmer has phone numbers of several contacts just in case that their 
preferred ones are too busy to come. Each contact also leaves their numbers to 
different farmers to get job offers. Some farmworkers told me that they could get 
endless job offers in the busy season from July to October and they could still work 
three to four days a week in the slack season. The wage is settled daily, so the 
organization of the work team is quite loose. Each farmworker has full freedom to 
choose their working days. Farmworkers can work as day labor thus to get a certain 
amount as wage or the wage can be counted by pieces. On average, the wage for a day 
labor is 100 yuan this year, which is ten times of the wage level in 2007. A skillful 
worker may get up to 150 yuan a day by piece based wage. The annual income of a 
farmworker can exceed 20,000 yuan. It has been much higher than the annual income 
of a peasant when the traditional agriculture was engaged on the household’s 
contracted land.  
“Chenggong people” and “bosses”  
Being outsiders as well as migrants, the farming entrepreneurs from Chenggong are 
not marginalized as the mass of migrant workers nor are they stigmatized as the 
“floating population”. On the contrary, they have a good fame in Songming. Their 
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identity as land-lost peasants has faded, instead, they are talked about as “Chenggong 
people” with the connotation of “rich people,” in local discourse. For example, some 
shopping experiences with wives of my male interlocutors in Songming informed me 
that it is even a shame to bargain with street venders as “Chenggong people”. 
“Chenggong people” are the main consumers of local expensive dining and 
entertainment locales, such as restaurants, KTVs, and sauna houses. Their 
farmworkers directly address them “boss” [laoban]. This title is later internalized into 
this group. Now they use it to greet each other. “Hey, boss. How’s business?” The 
term can be used to address both men and women. I heard husbands ask their 
wives:“ Boss, what do we eat today?” This internalization not only penetrates into the 
group, but also into individuals. Jiaxiang’s wife often said that her silent husband now 
became more and more voluble in front of people. “Being rich is really different,” she 
said. 
When Jiaxiang’s vegetables were to be harvested, I followed him to the nearby 
town seat to hire farmworkers. The town is called the “goat bridge” named after a 
bridge in the town. The labor market is set around the bridge. After morning meal, we 
drove the car to the goat bridge. The bridge was full of people standing and waiting 
for employment. I noticed that there were more women than men. The late autumn 
morning was cold. Female farmworkers all wrapped their head with colorful kerchiefs 
and folded their arms against the cold after standing too long outside. Whenever a car 
pulled over and a boss-like person walked out, a lot of people would rush to the 
person. The crowd made a jam on the bridge and the road. Passing drivers of cars, 
tractors and vans had to keep sounding the horn to clear their way. I was stunned for a 
moment when Jiaxiang got off the car. He was immediately surrounded by female 
workers. Jiaxiang’s two arms were dragged by several women while they anxiously 
persuaded him (almost like begging him) to hire them. Although pushed groggily like 
a drunken man, Jiaxiang appeared very calm. He calmly negotiated about the wage, 
time and the number of labors with them. When they talked, some women left him for 
me and said: “Boss, hire us. We can do job well.” I told them: “I’m not the boss. He 
is.” “Then could you let the boss know that we would like to accept the job for the 
wage he provides? The other women are our fellow villagers. We can’t say it in front 
of them.” I promised them that I would try, but I did not know how to reach the 
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“boss”, since he was surrounded tightly. Luckily, those women seemingly lost their 
patience since Jiaxiang would not agree to raise the wage. I led these women to talk to 
him again and the employment was set. The next morning was the harvest day. When 
I got up at 7 o’ clock in the morning, they had already been working in Jiaxiang’s 
greenhouses with head lights for two hours.  
In addition to the greenhouse farmers, there are several other “bosses” in the 
industrial chain in Songming. They are the chemical fertilizer providers, farm manure 
providers, pesticides and farm chemical sellers, cold storage runners and cold storage 
bosses. Except for the last one, Chenggong people mostly played all the other roles. 
To run businesses like these need more capital, and these capital came from their 
earlier successful businesses in Chenggong. Some of them can run multiple 
businesses in Songming. For instance, the pesticides and farm chemical shop runners 
also rent land and grow vegetables or flowers at the same time; or farm manure 
providers have their own chicken farms, and chicken manure is the by-product of their 
farms. No matter what, these entrepreneurial roles all reinforce the image of 
“Chenggong people”. 
Livelihood in Songming and life in Chenggong 
The migrant farmers lead a double life in Songming and Chenggong. In some sense, I 
argue that they have their livelihood in Songming, while having a life in Chenggong. 
Undoubtedly, they make their living mainly through running the greenhouse farm in 
Songming and only drive back to Chenggong every two weeks. Although Songming 
is the place where they spend most of their time, it is not “home”. Migrant farmers 
still elaborately maintain their social network back in Chenggong. When invited to 
wedding or funeral banquets, they will drive back to attend and stay one day or two. 
Even if asked for help in the guest hall for a banquet, they would go with pleasure 
without any complaints.  
The social network that they actively maintain in Songming is mainly among 
“bosses”, mainly their relatives or friends. The usual ways to mingle are eating 
together in restaurants or in their own place and play cards with cash stakes after that. 
When a family has a guest visiting, the host will take the chance to invite people over 
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and cook something better. I was treated such meals when I first came to visit 
Jiaxiang and his wife on their farm. They deliberately prepared more food for meals, 
so they also invited their neighbors and called relatives to come and eat together. The 
following days, we were invited to these families on their farms to eat and to play as 
well. I felt happy that I could meet more people and visit more farms through this 
circular treat, but also doubted if this was their real life in Songming. The festival-like 
life stopped when I was not treated as a guest coming from afar and life came back to 
normal. It is, just as they told me, idle.  
Migrant farmers may extend their social network to include some local village 
cadres, but this extension is more based on the instrumental guanxi (Yan 2000:181; 
see also Wilson 1997) which anticipates short-term payback. At the same time, my 
fieldwork indicates that migrant farmers seem to keep a distance with their 
farmworkers, or, in other words, they try to maintain a “working relationship” with 
them. For instance, when the farmworkers are hired to work on the farm, lunch 
becomes an issue that needs to be discussed ahead of time. If the farmworkers decide 
that they will bring their own food as lunch during work, they should be paid five 
yuan more as lunch subsidy. Otherwise, the migrant farmer family will cook lunch for 
them. With totally different etiquette from treating friends, the lunch is simply cooked 
and made of cheap food ingredients in order to cut cost. Once, when Jiaxiang’s wife 
complained that the farmworkers did not harvest vegetables well into baskets if she 
stopped watching them. I asked: “If we serve them some better food at lunch, perhaps 
they will do better jobs?” She replied me: “No, that doesn’t work. I tried before. 
These people are ungrateful. They just care about how much they can earn from you.” 
Migrant farmers’ daily life on their farm was quite simple or even tedious. 
Besides the busy time, such as the time of seedling transplantation or harvest, the 
daily work is just watering or sometimes spraying fertilizers. Farmers eat quite simple 
food at times. They grow some vegetables outside the greenhouses for self-
subsistence, so they only need to drive to the food market once in a while to buy some 
meat. At times, watching TV is a common way to kill time. Farmers install the 
satellite dish on their house. TV is turned on the whole day. They can catch up with 
almost all the latest popular TV series and shows. Besides the entertaining program, 
they are also keen on domestic news and weather forecast, since the news might help 
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them foresee the price of their vegetables. The agricultural channel is one of their 
favorites, too. It is difficult to link them with the stereotype of rural people as illiterate 
and ignorant subjects, since they enthusiastically improve their knowledge.  
Story telling is often a good way by which migrant farmers cultivate their 
cultural capital. One such story was about two agricultural college graduates who after 
graduation brought money to invest the greenhouse farm. They worked very hard on 
the farm, but still did not earn any money. Not only that, the big bundle of money that 
they had brought to Songming shrank to a small stack. “Two poor young men,” 
Lintao said, “I admire their courage. If their farm was near mine, I would like to teach 
them how to manage.” When talking about their greenhouse farming, they always 
sounded very proud of themselves. Moreover, as the story shows, even with an 
average primary school diploma, they are not afraid to be the teachers of college 
students.  
This partially explains why villagers in Chenggong are not anxious to pursue a 
high academic achievement. Villagers were quite successful in agribusiness. The 
farming knowledge eclipsed the officially enacted school diploma in their rural 
society. A high academic diploma could not guarantee a good job considering the 
competitive employment situation, while land was always the last resort for a good 
life. Villagers in their fifties or sixties dropped out of school early mainly due to the 
historical reasons (for example, the Cultural Revolution), while adults in their thirties 
and forties whom I talked with were still mostly with primary school diploma. 
Younger generations dropped out with higher degrees. Very few went to college. 
Despite the generation difference, people give the same reason for dropping out: 
cannot read more. They do not appear upset about it and young people are not blamed 
by their families for this, either. Some villagers just attribute it to the lack of talent. 
“Study needs talent. If he doesn’t have it, it is useless to push him,” one grandparent 
said.  
However, after relocation, the “last resort” does not exist anymore. Life and 
livelihood changes seem to bring new pressure on children’s education. A local 
primary school teacher who I interviewed told that now young parents were more 
serious about their children’s education, actively supervising them to finish homework. 
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She also expressed her worries about those kids whose parents are migrant farmers 
and have problem spending time with their children and taking care of their study. 
Villagers engaged in migrant farming are mostly in their thirties or forties. While the 
couple spend most of their time taking care of vegetables in other counties, their 
children, aging from teenager to their early twenties, were left home alone or were 
taken care of by their grandparents. Some villagers I talked with claimed that they 
gave up choosing to do migrant farming for their children’s sake. They worried that 
without parents’ supervision their children’s education would be influenced.  
Additionally, the livelihood of migrant farming brings some changes to female 
villagers. The migrant family is always composed of a couple. They are both familiar 
with the operation of the greenhouse. They work as partners and backup each other. 
When the husband drives out to order seedlings on seedling farms, the wife stays to 
deal with onsite business; when the wife follows the truck to sell vegetables in cold 
storage, the husband stays to settle the payment to farmworkers. Wives are called 
“bosses” by their farmworkers instead of the “wife of the boss” [laobanniang], which 
implies that they share the same status with their husbands in farm affairs. 
Disembedded from the constraint of the kinship for some time, the conjugal 
relationship comes to the front. Either husband or wife is important partner to each 
other in business and in the tedious farm life. Some wives claimed that they felt more 
intimate with their husband after they migrated to the farm. Although women play 
important role in family business and are able to participate in the decision-making, 
men are still dominant the public sphere. Such as in the case of negotiation with the 
young Cantonese and the village cadres, the female are thought inappropriate to attend. 
Additionally, wives often go back to Chenggong to look after children, while the 
husband spend more time on the farm, which impresses it that men are responsible for 
the business and women are still responsible for the family.  
The dilemma of farming entrepreneurs 
While the earliest entrepreneurs experienced the initial hardship, yet also made a great 
fortune, the followers engaged in greenhouse farming are to some extent stimulated 
by the supportive policy enacted by the district government of Chenggong, especially 
the version of 2009. Renting land and continuing farming is a policy sponsored by the 
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district government to solve the issue of the unemployment among the local land-lost 
peasants. The supportive policy issued in 2009 stipulates that households that rent 
land outside the new district of Chenggong can get a subsidy from the government. 
With land area ranging from five mu to ten mu, and with the tenure more than five 
years, each household can get a cash subsidy of 500 yuan per mu each year for five 
years; if the rented land is more than ten mu, the supportive policy will refer to the 
one for entrepreneurs (Chenggong Online, November 10
th
 2011). The supportive 
policy to some degree offset the risk of greenhouse farming and stimulates land-lost 
peasants to engage in migrant farming. It is reported that the district government of 
Chenggong granted a cash subsidy of 45,000,000 yuan between 2006 and 2010 to 
subsidize land-lost peasants renting land. Local media address them “foregoers of 
becoming well-off” [zhifu daitouren], and the evidence of peasants in Chenggong 
“losing land but not unemployed” [shidi bushiye], although encouraging land-lost 
peasants to continue farming seemingly contradicts the purpose of local state’s “one-
step urbanization” concept which aims at urbanizing the rural population.  
The facility of the mature industrial chain also attracts more greenhouse 
investors in Songming. Not only land-lost peasants in Chenggong, but also people 
from other regions in and outside Yunnan. The input of massive investors as 
greenhouse farmers pushes up the price of land and the price of farm labor. Five years 
ago, the yearly rent for a plot of one mu was 2,000 yuan, while this year the rent has 
been raised to 3,000 yuan in Songming. The salary for a daily farm worker is also 
raised from 10 yuan per day in 2007 to 100 yuan nowadays. With new farming skills, 
some local farmers are not willing to rent their land to outsiders. Instead, they want to 
be greenhouse farmers themselves and make a fortune out of it . This aggravates the 
shortage of both land supply and labor. It is more and more difficult to find a good 
piece of land with a proper price. The higher threshold not only blocks new land-lost 
peasants in Chenggong to choose it as a livelihood, but also makes current ones 
reconsider their choice when the lease expires.  
Furthermore, some critical voices are also heard. Although the migrant 
farming is represented as “skilled migration” for the “regional economic development” 
and the farming entrepreneurs are “folk angels” of the “integration of central Yunnan” 
by local media in Kunming, some counter-discourses emerge from a neighboring city 
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where many Chenggong peasants flocked in. Local media in those places express 
concerns about the issue of local water pollution since the greenhouse farming 
consumes chemical fertilizers, pesticides and farm chemicals far more than the 
traditional farming. They blame land-lost peasants from Chenggong as outsiders to be 
too eager for quick wealth and instant benefits to think of the local environment 
protection (Yunnan Network, January 30
th
 2011).  
Concluding remarks 
It has been ten years since the new city construction started up in 2003. Although 
renting land to do farming was not an unknown realm for my people since some of 
them had tried renting farmland from neighboring villages when their greenhouse 
farming business blossomed, it would be an ordeal to kick off from scratch in a 
strange place. Despite the subsidy from the local government as stimulus, migrant 
farmers draw largely on kinship ties as well as other social capital accumulated in 
their village in Chenggong.  
Technically, migrant farmers belong to the “floating population” as well, in 
that they have their livelihood in places other than their native place, and are excluded 
from the local society. However, they are not problematized as the “floating 
population”; instead, they are portrayed as the glorious outcome of urbanization.  
Compared with the massive rural migrant workers in China, my people show 
many differences. In the academic discourse, rural migrant workers are a group who 
lacks reciprocal integration. They are integrated with the rural society at their home 
village, which is usually far from the metropolis where they make their living. Some 
migrant workers can only go back home once a year for a family reunion on the 
occasion of the Spring Festival, while others may not get a chance to go back for 
years. While spending more time living in cities, they are not socially integrated with 
the urban society or within the urban polity. They are “floaters”. They are 
marginalized in the sense that their right to the city has been constrained and their 
capacity of negotiating such right with other agencies has been weakened (Wu 
2010:12).  
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Migrant farmers from Chenggong show several characteristics that demarcate 
them from the massive migrant workers in China. First, the direction differs. Rural 
migrant workers migrate from rural to urban, while migrant farmers in Chenggong go 
from urban to rural. A second distinction lies in the relationship with the home 
villages. In order to maximize the job opportunities and chances, migrant workers 
tend to migrate to bigger cities that may be far away from their remote home village 
and entails a disconnection with the social ties. Migrant farmers from Chenggong do 
not necessarily settle in faraway places, but in places that give them easy access back 
to the village. The social network in the home village is the significant source of their 
social capital, cultural capital and economic capital, which is related to various 
aspects of their life and livelihood. Thus, subjectively, they intend to keep integrating 
in their village in Chenggong. Third, they achieve different territoriality at their 
destinations. Migrant workers live as “floaters” in “urban villages” in cities with little 
territoriality, while migrant farmers live as “investors” and “bosses” and settle in their 
own farms with certain locally extended social network, which brings them much 
more control over territoriality.  
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CHAPTER 5  Conclusion: towards new Chinese 
subjectivities 
In the final chapter, I want to place my study in a wider Chinese context that relates to 
how the Chinese people have gone through major changes since the Communist 
regime established in 1949. Some of the changes relate to the processes of 
urbanization, but in the Maoist era the cities and the countryside were kept strictly 
apart, and the countryside, i.e. the peasants, were seen as “behind” the urban 
population in cultural development. Nevertheless, at the same time, Mao introduced 
land reforms to give land to the peasants, taking it from the former landlords, and later 
to give it to the state, making the peasants into a communist collective working for the 
Revolution. My case from Chenggong can be put into this historical context, as I will 
do here. The case itself shows post-Mao developments, in which the rural peasants 
have been brought into the economic developments in China, developments that are 
labelled “Capitalist-like” and “market oriented”, as represented by the move from the 
peasant villages to the urban areas of Chenggong. What I aim to show is that my case 
represents a kind of “in between” situation. It does not show a total dichotomy 
between the former rural and the present urban way of life. Rather, the case shows an 
interesting mingling of processes through which new patterns emerge while earlier 
rural, and traditional, patterns remain and become transformed in the process. Let me 
illustrate briefly what I mean, and start with the broader history, before I link this to 
my own analysis presented in the thesis.  
A historical view 
China has moved from the Maoist phase, with revolutionary class struggle and near 
imperial sovereignty to one of policy-focused, regulation oriented and economy-
building global society. China went from a system in which sacrificing your life for 
the revolutionary cause was left, and a new reality, focusing on the development of 
people and society and a revitalization of Confucian ethics, took over. Obviously, 
such a change in three decades affects different parts of China, their local histories 
and ethnographies of everyday life in different ways. Local, traditional realities are 
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mixed with the new developments with new understandings of rights and duties, in 
short, a change not only in social life, but also in Chinese subjectivities providing a 
basis for a new Chinese citizen. Hence, an important part of any study on China today 
will contain an element of such changing relationships between people and the state. 
What strikes us today is the development of the economy, of a new understanding of 
how to develop the population and the social body.  
The rural subjects in the history of socialist China 
One important context is the discursive construction of rural peasants in China as 
backward and primitive, but also as a revolutionary vanguard. We can get an 
impression of this by focusing on the history of land reform, and how such reform 
periods affected the subjectivity of Chinese peasants. Land reform was key to the 
Communist agenda and since right before the communists took power in 1949, the 
country has gone through three land reforms.  
The first reform happened in early 1950s when the regime redistributed land to 
peasants. This era known just as the Land Reform period in Chinese history 
established the “village people’s government” marking the thorough penetration of 
central power into the lowest reaches of rural society, which was different from the 
earlier situation, both during the imperial and the Republican regimes, when 
government only reached down to the level of the county (Chen 2007:150). 
Accordingly, in the official Marxist party propaganda, peasants were “a revolutionary 
actor central to the Chinese Revolution, and to the historical transformation of China 
from a feudal to a socialist society” (Day 2013:4).  
The second reform was featured as the period of collectivization. The Maoist 
regime monopolized the purchase and sale of grain and began to control the livelihood 
of peasants in 1953. The total economic control was not achieved until 1958 when 
rural collectivization culminated in the establishment of People’s Communes to 
replace the townships. A commune consisted of three tiers of organization that 
encapsulated nearly the entire rural population: the commune at the top level, the 
production brigade at the intermediate level, and the production team at the bottom 
level, which were administratively equivalent to the township, village, and 
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neighborhood respectively. The commune merged the administrative, organizational, 
and socioeconomic structures into one. Meanwhile, villagers were confined to their 
villages by the new household registration [hukou] system. With their own plots of 
land confiscated and physical mobility tightly restricted, peasants were turned from 
land-holding peasants into state-employed agricultural laborers (Chen 2007:151). 
However, the material deprivation of rural people only added to their revolutionary 
potential in official rhetoric, and the classes of privileged , intellectual urbanites were, 
particularly during the Cultural Revolution, asked to go down to the countryside to 
learn from the peasants (Kipnis 1997:168). 
The third reform was marked by the decollectivization that began in 1978, 
when China instituted the household responsibility system. Since then, China has 
been poised between its former fully collective system of property management and a 
full system of private property allowing farmers to buy and sell land (Bossen 2002:86). 
In 1983, the commune system was abolished and the township government was 
resurrected. Corresponding changes were undertaken on the lower level: the 
production brigade was restored to the village and the production team was renamed 
as the “village group” [cunmin xiaozu]. Meanwhile, since the level of village was 
redesignated as villagers’ self-governing organization in this era, the village election 
for the “village committee” was institutionalized. During most of the 1980s, de-
collectivization improved peasants’ means of living and to some degree narrowed the 
urban-rural income gap.  
Throughout this history there seems always to have been a clear difference in 
China between the rural and the urban areas. And, according to Wen, an agricultural 
economist, the reason is the following. With the commune system and the state 
controlled purchasing and marketing of grain in the rural areas, and the state 
subsidizing grain, housing, medical care and education in the urban areas, the dual 
household registration system was aiming at seizing the agricultural surplus through 
the compulsory purchase of agricultural products at a suppressed price for the “state 
capitalist primitive accumulation” (Wen in Day 2008:53). In short – rural areas 
produced surpluses on which the urban population survived. Wen argues that by 
keeping rural residents firmly in the countryside, these institutions reduced the cost 
and increased the efficiency of transferring rural surplus into the industrialization 
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process. In this sense, the rural sector was made to sacrifice for the development of 
the nation, primarily represented by urban China. However, the development strategy 
left the country with a binary system that places the city and the countryside in an 
“antagonistic contradiction” (Day 2008:56) creating increasing levels of inequality, 
placing the rural population in the position of persistent poverty and scarcity of 
resources.  
But during the Maoist era this situation was concealed behind a rhetoric in 
which the peasants were a revolutionary vanguard on which China’s future socialist 
society was to be built. This changed with the period following Mao’s death and the 
end of the Cultural Revolution. The de-politicization of society in the “Deng era” the 
glorified and revolutionary portrait of peasants was ended. Instead, in both official 
propaganda and popular and intellectual writing, the peasantry became problematic: 
backward, harboring remnants of feudal thinking, and being represented as the root 
cause of China’s slow development as well as of its violent history (Day 2013: 5). 
Rural subjects were presented as backward, uncivilized and feudal remnants. In the 
1990s, a crisis broke out characterized by deteriorating conditions of farming, the 
sliding of peasant income due to the falling agricultural prices and rising costs of 
agricultural inputs, and cadre corruption. During this crisis peasants and rural China 
were characterized as the source of crisis (Day 2013:6). The crisis was relieved as the 
peasant burden was alleviated through the tax-for-fee [fei gai shui] reform in 2002 and 
the repeal of the agricultural tax in 2006.  
Back to my Chenggong Peasants 
Returning to the peasants of this thesis, the people of Chenggong, I have heard many 
overlapping references during my fieldwork that can be linked to this history. My 
informants refer constantly to the collective they are part of as “our village”, at other 
times as “our brigade” or “our group”. Furthermore they tell the absurd stories about 
the collectivized times, stories of pain and suffering, and also about their struggle for 
a better life after “reform and opening up”. They talk about their experience of being 
looked down upon by urbanites in Kunming and give self-mockery: “We rural 
peasants are just uncultured, uneducated”. Part of the stories also contains a reflection 
of their present situation, after they have settled in the urban environment of 
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Chenggong. These stories, referring to the life I have described in this thesis, are 
positive stories. Most of the time people will say that right now they have the best life 
ever. There seems to be no sense of loss, of their land, of their former way of life, of 
their culture and identity. Rather, it seems clear that my informants are happy with the 
process of urbanization, and that they attribute the former misfortunes to individual’s 
destiny and the inevitable demand of Marxian determinism of earlier times. They have 
finished with the past, and are ready to move forward. 
Yet, the point here is not empirical. Rather it is to remind ourselves that the 
changes we see also will lead to new subjectivities. And this is what I want to focus 
on in ending my thesis. Now, in the contemporary context, where people are faced 
with more choices, leading to both successes as well as failures, how can we locate 
changing subjectivities? Where do we find society and the social, with lineages, clans, 
families, associations, communities and so on? And what is the new relationship 
between the individual and this social level and the state? The bureaucratic state is a 
huge monster that is difficult to penetrate, particularly for people way down in the 
system. So the relationship of guanxi is one factor that helps people to get access to 
necessary levels within the state system. But the same principle is also operating on 
the social level. It helps tie people together in the same way social rules of friendship 
and other types of relationships do. Perhaps such relationships may help in the 
dealings with the state, but in the process the acting subjects are also changing. The 
peasants in Chenggong show us a specific version of this history. 
Before I sum up the empirical conclusions I should also indicate some 
conceptual directions I want to make use of in this summary discussion. I draw on 
Sherry Ortner’ s definition of subjectivity as “the ensemble of modes of perception, 
affect, thought, desire, fear, and so forth that animate acting subjects”, as well as the 
“cultural and social formations that shape, organize, and provoke those modes of 
affect, thought and so on” (Ortner 2005:31 ). This definition stresses both the inner 
states of acting subjects and large scale cultural formations. By acting subjects, Ortner 
understands subjects as “fully culturally and structurally produced”, but also “able to 
act on and sometimes against the structures that made them” (Ortner 2005:33). She 
contends that the element of agency lies in the assumption that actors are at least 
partially “knowing subjects” who “have some degree of reflexivity about themselves 
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and their desires” (Ortner 2005:34). Based on the partially “knowing subjects”, Ortner 
conceptualizes a complex subjectivity in which a subject partially internalizes and 
partially reflects upon or against a set of circumstances in which he/she finds 
him/herself (Ortner 2005:45). In her theoretical image, “actors bound but choosing, 
constrained but transforming, both strategically manipulating and unconscious of the 
frames within which they move” (Luhrmann 2006:346). In addition to the 
investigation at the level of individual actors or groups of actors, subjectivity at a 
broader cultural and political level examines how particular cultural formations shape 
subjectivity. Here Ortner herself draws on Raymond Williams (Ortner 2005:45). 
Williams understands cultural formations as a cultural system with both the 
hegemonic cultural formations, as well as what he calls the “residual” ones as 
countercurrents to the hegemonic ones.  
In the case of Chenggong, the dominant formation is a story of urbanization, 
modernity and individualization, whereas there are rural sub-cultures (Kipnis 1997) as 
countercurrents which invoke countercurrents in villagers’ subjectivity. Linking this 
to my ethnographic discussion we can say that the hegemonic cultural formation can 
be a clusters of political discourses coming from both the central state and the local 
state at various levels, in that “state power is interrelated processes of multiple centers 
of authority-building” (Hsing 2002:8) in contemporary China. Moreover, the rural 
population has been experiencing intensive and drastic changes in the history of 
communist China, but in spite of contemporary changes in this situation, the historical 
discourses that have objectify the rural peasantry in certain ways do not totally 
disappear. On the contrary, they are re-emerging here and there, still affecting the 
shaping of the subjectivity of rural subjects. 
If I translate this type of thinking into my empirical analysis in this thesis, we 
can see for instance that the standardized architecture and spatial lay-out of residential 
compounds in Chenggong, and the standardized food market within the compound, 
manifest the state’s hegemonic planning mentality (Scott 1998:6) and desire to 
discipline the subjects to be civilized urbanites with high cultural quality, or suzhi. 
This “public architecture” puts people into a new setting in which they can become 
modern, leaving the dirty and chaotic environment they come from. This lay-out 
appeals to the top-down view of the state, and matches the state’s modernist aesthetics. 
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The problem, according to Scott, is that such a perspective ignores the “actual activity 
of the society” (1986:3). As a result, and as we have seen in my discussion, villagers 
themselves mobilize to remold the lay-out with their own territorial logic. The 
creations of the various gathering sites, the “little street” and the guest hall in the 
urban residential compound help to bring back villagers feelings about their former 
community with familiarity and affability. Hence, a hegemonic level of state decisions 
is modified by a “residual countercurrent”. 
The sense of ownership is also materialized in the village’s self-governance. 
The self-governance includes the election of village committee, the management of 
real estate within the resettlement residential compound and the management of 
collective assets. The compensation policy enacted by local district government not 
only laid a great material foundation for the village collective, but also capitalized part 
of the reserved cash compensation. This changed villagers’ role from passive land-lost 
peasants during the urbanization to investors of it. Villagers’ involvement in 
urbanization also refers to their reemployment relying on local employment market 
and other ways to improve their income. Again, a hegemonic policy of state subsidies 
and systems of financing urbanization also provides a basis for new initiatives among 
people, and help produce agency.  
Thus, the views and expectations about urbanization in Chenggong are 
different from what we see in many other cases of urbanization. Certainly they have 
moved from a rural to an urban environment, and certainly, many changes are going 
on, but the Chenggong people that I worked with respond not as losers and victims, 
but more like active participants in a situation that provided new opportunities. For 
instance, as shareholders in the local development, they share similar desires with the 
local government, expecting more outsiders to come into the area, as such renqi will 
enhance their property value and job opportunities.  
In addition, villagers’ sense of ownership also comes from their daily practices. 
Although the landscape is totally changed, this does not give them feelings of 
alienation. Chenggong is still “their place” with their memory, their homes, their jobs 
and their main social networks. Villagers’ self-cognition not only comes from the 
relationship between them and urbanization, but also lies in their interactions with 
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other social groups practically and discursively. The migration of farming 
entrepreneurs to other counties greatly enhanced the status and reputation of 
“Chenggong people”, and through this they “challenge” the negative stigma and 
discrimination they faced as “rural peasants” during the past three decades. 
All the processes indicated above, and which are discussed in detail in the 
thesis, can be summarized by the concept of “civic territoriality.” This is Hsing’s term, 
and I use it to argue that land-lost peasants in Chenggong, through their re-
territorialization of their new urban environment, are in the process also of shaping a 
new subjectivity. But the dynamic is not only defined by spatial re-territorialization. 
There are also other changing dynamics that make the subjectivity a very complex and 
open-ended process. First of all, the process is not homogeneous. The increased 
availability of different livelihood strategies make people benefit from urbanization in 
different ways and to different extents. Some villagers become entrepreneurs with 
considerable accumulation of wealth; others become urban wage labors facing a 
reduction of income compared to before. Second, the choices of livelihoods, both as 
entrepreneurs and wage laborers, are not static. It is influenced by many factors, such 
as the intervention of local policies, with subsidies or with serious restrictions. Then 
there is the supply and demand of local job markets, which also affects the 
opportunities. This is not entirely new. There have always been tensions between 
people’s rural background and how they make a living in urban settings. Uncertainties 
and risks have always defined livelihood strategies. This ambiguity make people in 
Chenggong to rely more on their collective identity and rural social network, thus also 
reproducing their own identity in the process, limiting the process of “socio-cultural 
urbanization”. Third, the complexity also lies in the difference between genders and 
among generations. After relocated in the urban settings, women get more chances to 
work outside and become irreplaceable for the increase of family income. Their 
introduction of urban activities such as the “square dance” to their life in the 
resettlement residential compound shows that they are not shy to display themselves 
in the public sphere anymore. The seniors embrace their leisure retirement and do not 
have to struggle with their livelihood. For both positive changes are felt and 
commented on. The young generations are also more adaptable to changes and with 
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them the new patters will be taken forward. All the processes and dynamics contribute 
to a complex and open-ended subjectivity of the Chenggong people. 
It is too early to draw a conclusion about the new subjectivity that local land-
lost peasants have in the urbanization in Chenggong, given the drastically changing 
socioeconomic dynamics locally and in the macro level changes of the state, but my 
preliminary findings on lost-land peasants echo Ortner’s views of the subject as 
“existentially complex, a being who feels and thinks and reflects, who makes and 
seeks meaning” (Ortner 2005:33) and we can see that the post-relocation activities of 
land-lost peasants in Chenggong reflect a complex subjectivity provoked by a 
combination of the historical cultural formations and the current dynamics shaped by 
the move into the urban area of Chenggong and the various urbanization processes 
people become part of there. 
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Glossary 
aixinka 爱心卡 loving heart bus card 
anzhi xiaoqu 安置小区 resettlement residential compound 
baochan daohu 包产到户 household responsibility system 
baodi 包地 to rent land 
baozhuli 宝珠梨 “Baozhu” pears 
chengzhongcun 城中村 village in the city; urban village 
cunmin xiaozu 村民小组 village group 
dachu 大厨 chef 
dagong 打工 to work as an employee 
dilu 地炉 pit furnace 
fei gai hui 费改税 tax-for-fee 
guangchangwu 广场舞 public square dance, line dance 
heiche 黑车 illegal taxi 
Huaxiang, guoxiang, 
caixiang 
花乡,果乡,菜
乡 
town of flowers, fruits and vegetables 
jiedao 街道 sub-district 
jiewenlou 接吻楼 kissing building 
jiudi chengshihua 就地城市化 inplace urbanization 
ketang 客堂 guest hall 
lanmianku “烂面库” “bad noodle storage” 
laoban 老板 boss 
laobanniang 老板娘 boss’s wife 
laonian daxue 老年大学 Seniors’ college  
lengku 冷库 cold storage 
liudong renkou 流动人口 floating population; migrant worker 
luan 乱 chaos 
luohou 落后 backward 
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mei wenhua 没文化 uneducated; uncivilized 
minban jiaoshi 民办教师 private teachers 
naibaicai 奶白菜 milk Chinese cabbage 
nongmingong 农民工 migrant worker; peasant-worker 
qingke 请客 to banquet guest 
renqi 人气 human vitality; dynamisms; popularity 
shengchan daogu de 
haiwan bazi 
生产稻谷的
海湾坝子 
a piece of plain land near the gulf and 
with abundance of rice 
shequ 社区 community 
shidi bushiye 失地不失业 losing land but not unemployed 
shidi nongmin  失地农民 land-lost peasant; landless peasant; 
dislocated peasants 
shidi nongmin chuangye 
jidi 
失地农民创
业基地 
land-lost peasants entrepreneurial base 
suzhi 素质 quality of people 
tuanshencai 团生菜 head lettuce 
tuhao 土豪 bling or nouveau riche 
woshoulou 握手楼 shake-hands building 
xiaojie 小街 little street 
yibu chengshihua 一步城市化 one-step urbanization 
youmaicai 油麦菜 leaf lettuce 
zhaijidi 宅基地 housing plot 
zhifu daitouren 致富带头人 foregoers of becoming well-off 
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